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"…[E]xecutive compensation abruptly shifted in the United States during the 
1990s, moving from a cash-based system to an equity-based system.  More 
importantly, this shift was not accompanied by any compensating change in 
corporate governance to control the predictably perverse incentives… ."1 
 
Abstract 
A massive wave of corporate fraud at the beginning of the twenty first century 
exposed the failure of corporate gatekeepers.  The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation accordingly 
targeted gatekeepers, primarily auditors, by imposing strict regulation and enhanced 
independence guidelines.  This legislative remedy is of disputable benefit while its costs have 
been huge.  This paper maintains that a certain type of auditor incentive compensation could 
work better than regulation.  Under such an alternative scheme, auditors would defer a portion 
of the payment they receive from the client firm, which would be used to purchase shares in 
the client after their tenure as auditor has ended.   Instead of making them simply 
independent, this compensation structure would cause auditors to fend against inflated share 
prices.  This type of auditor compensation could, therefore, serve to counterbalance recent 
trends in executive compensation that cause managers to overstate earnings.  Modern 
accounting standards that augment management’s scope of discretion make the suggested 
type of auditor compensation even more beneficial.   Thus, the paper advocates calls for the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to promulgate a safe harbor that would facilitate such 
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compensation schemes, which current independence guidelines do not allow. 
  
I. Introduction 
The surge in executive incentive compensation is perhaps the most salient corporate 
phenomenon of the last fifteen years.2 The old practice of compensating managers with a 
fixed salary and bonus has disappeared, and executive pay today consists in large part of 
stock options and other methods of pay-for-performance.3  Pay-for-performance has also been 
the cause for the more than tripling of total compensation for top executives in the last fifteen 
years.4  The change in compensation practice was no less than a revolution. While in 1985, 
the value of the options granted was only 8% of the average CEO total compensation,5 in the 
period between 1992 to1998, their value rose from 15% to 40%,6 peaking in 2000 at 78% of 
the average total compensation.7 Moreover, while in 1980, only 57% of the top executives 
held options in their firms, this had risen to 87% by 1994;8 in the year 1999 alone, 94% of the 
2  Kevin F. Hallock & Kevin J. Murphy, THE ECONOMICS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (K. Hallock & 
K. Murphy eds., 1999) (reporting a surge in the number of papers that discuss executive compensation in the 
1990s). 
3  Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How, 68 
HARV. BUS. REV. 138 (1990) (reviewing U.S. executive compensation in the period from 1969 to 1983 and 
revealing that executives’ pay is hardly keyed to the performance of the corporations they run and concluding, 
therefore, that U.S. managers are actually paid like bureaucrats); Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs 
Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J. ECON. 653, 655 (1998) (reviewing compensation practices of the 400 
largest public firms and concluding that executives are no longer paid like bureaucrats and that pay is linked to 
performance). 
4  Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 49 (2003) 
(reporting and discussing executive option grants). 
5 See Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive 
Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 64 (1992) (an empirical study of 800 public firms). 
6 See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options, 90 AM. 
ECON. REV. 209 (2002); Todd Perry & Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment 
or Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 131 (2000); Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, 
Economics, and Executive Compensation, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 719 (1995) (an extensive review of executive 
compensation practices among 1000 large public firms,  revealing, among other issues, that options accounted 
for 23% of total executive compensation, averaging $1,300,000 per each of the top-five paid executives). 
7 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. 
POL’Y 283, 290 tbl. 4 (2005) (reporting compensation figures for S&P 500 firms); Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining 
Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
847, 848 (2002) (discussing growth in executive compensation).  
8 See Hall & Liebman, supra note 3, at 663. 
 
 






                                                          
largest companies granted options to their executives.9 
While the new practice carries certain benefits,10 it is also easy to see that it produces 
unfavorable incentives that encourage securities fraud or at least sugarcoating of financial 
reporting.11  Stock-based compensation typically amounts to a sizable proportion of 
executives' assets portfolios, and when the corporation’s stock is overvalued by the market, 
managers can reap a sizable profit.12  For this reason, the practice of paying managers with 
stock and stock options has been described as “throwing gasoline” onto the market “fire."13 
Given these circumstances, it was only a matter of time until crises would arise. 
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the twenty-first century has witnessed a series 
of unprecedented financial debacles involving such American giants as Enron, Global 
Crossing, WorldCom, and Tyco. This has proved, however, to be only the tip of the iceberg of 
a huge phenomenon of misreporting by many firms,14 one of several factors that led to the 
9 See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J. ACCT. ECON. 3, 
4 (2002) (reviewing executive compensation in the largest 500 U.S. firms); see also Marcel Kahan, The Limited 
Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1888 (2000) (reporting that, in 
1996, in a sample of 250 large public firms, 90% of the companies used stock-option compensation). 
10  See the discussion below in infra note 41 and in the text above.  
11  See, e.g., Shane A. Johnson et al., Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud (2006) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=395960 (showing that firms charged with accounting fraud 
had more executive stock-based compensation than found for a matching sample of firms unsuspected of 
securities fraud); Jap Efendi, Anup Srivastava & Edward P. Swanson, Why Do Corporate Managers Misstate 
Financial Statements? The Role of Option Compensation and Other Factors, 85 J. FIN. ECON.  667 (2007) 
(showing that firms that restated their financial statements had more executive stock-based compensation than 
found for a matching sample of firms that did not restate their earnings). Additional evidence discussed below in 
infra Part II.  The view that equity-based compensation encourages financial misreporting is also widespread 
amongst public and within financial circles. See, for example, the statement made by Senator William Gramm 
linking the accounting misconduct of Enron’s managers to their compensation scheme, 148 Cong. Rec. S6628 
(daily ed. July 11, 2002). 
12  See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 174-79 (2004) (explaining the common practices of executive stock-option grants, 
vesting, and exercise). 
13  Michael C. Jensen, Agency Cost of Overvalued Equity, 34 FIN. MGMT. 5 (2005).  
14  According to the Corporate Fraud Task Force, since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, no less 
than 214 CEOs, 53 CFOs, and 23 corporate counsels and attorneys have been convicted in the U.S. for corporate 
fraud.  Wrongdoing is, of course, a much larger phenomenon than these conviction cases are directly indicative 
of. See Kate Plourd, Quick: How Many CFOs Have Been Convicted?, CFO.COM, July 19, 2007, at 
www.cfo.com/article.cfm/9502734/c_9512631?f=home_todayinfinance;see also SECOND YEAR REPORT TO THE 










                                                          
securities market bubble and its subsequent bursting at the beginning of the century.15  As 
explained above, managers, especially those armed with options and other types of stock-
based compensation, simply benefit from misreporting that can artificially inflate the market 
value of their enterprise, even if the stock prices eventually fall.16  The Sarbanes-Oxley 2002 
corporate reform act targeted this very conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders, introducing a variety of mechanisms aimed at improving transparency and 
accuracy of financial reporting.17 The legislation also intensively engages in regulation of 
third parties such as external auditors and legal counsel who serve as gatekeepers and may 
deflect misreporting.18 Included amongst the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s measures are more 
stringent disclosure rules,19 mandatory managerial certification of periodic reports, greater 
15  Eric F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 
CONN. L. REV. 393 (2006) (demonstrating with a historical survey that stock market bubbles almost invariably 
coincide with securities fraud epidemics). 
16  For the robust empirical evidence, see infra Part II.b. 
17  Sarbanes-Oxley, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 745 (codified at U.S.C. §§ 15, 
18). Stephen M. BAINBRIDGE, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO SARBANES-OXLEY, UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ 
Research Paper No. 07-17 (2007), explains that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has had the biggest impact on American 
business of any federal securities legislation since the New Deal. Academia and market reactions to the Act were 
mixed.  On the one hand proponents argue that it improved transparency and accuracy of financial reporting.  
See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It Just 
Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003); John C. Coates, IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 91 (2007); Stephen Wagner & Lee Dittmar, The Unexpected Benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Apr. 2006, at 133. On the other hands opponents claim that the Act unjustifiably increases the 
regulatory burden on public firms (see, e.g., Harvey Coustan, Linda M. Leinicke, W. Max Rexford & Joyce A. 
Ostrosky, Sarbanes-Oxley: What It Means to the Marketplace, 197 J. ACCT. 43 (2004); Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 
1125 (2003) (“[T]he Act also seems to contemplate ‘real time’ disclosure of material business developments 
even in circumstances where premature disclosure may well sacrifice shareholder value for very little gain in 
capital market efficiency. This I call ‘price-perfecting disclosure’ and believe that eliminating the board's 
discretion to this extent may be unwise… ."); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate 
Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L.1 (2002); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1528 (2005) ("SOX was 
emergency legislation, enacted under conditions of limited legislative debate, during a media frenzy involving 
several high-profile corporate fraud and insolvency cases.")). For the mixed response to the Act in the 
marketplace, see, e.g., John S. Lublin & Kara Scannell, Critics See Some Good From Sarbanes-Oxley, W.S.J., 
July 30, 2007, at B1 (citing market participants on the fifth anniversary of the Act and recognizing some of its 
benefits  although viewing it largely as excessively costly). 
18  Reinier Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 53 (1983). 
19  For instance, increased disclosure of off-balance sheet transactions.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 401(j), 2002 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) at 786 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(j)). 
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board independence with enhanced financial understanding,20 and, perhaps most 
importantly, improved auditor oversight and independence requi
This paper takes a different approach to the problem of managerial bias and suggests 
a radical transformation in current methods of compensating gatekeepers, particularly external 
auditors.22  One scholar has described the prevailing practices of executive stock-based 
compensation as a major development that corporate governance practices have failed to 
respond to thus far.23 The transformation of gatekeeper compensation practices proposed here 
can constitute just such a needed response for the new practices of executive compensation. 
The gist of this proposed compensation scheme is to combat the noted conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders by creating incentives for auditors to fend off any 
misleading reporting by the corporation.  Accordingly, in order to counter managers' 
incentives to inflate share prices, a properly designed stock-based compensation plan for 
gatekeepers would create incentives for the latter to deflate share prices.24  
An old and well-sustained principle of corporate governance precludes 
20  Perhaps the most salient requirement in this area is that all listed companies create audit committees 
comprised solely of independent directors.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) at 775-77 
(codified at 15 U.S.C.  § 78j-l(m)). 
21  Among the steps taken is the creation of a public board to oversee auditors. Sarbanes-Oxley Act  § 101, 
2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) at 750-53 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211). See also discussion on the auditor 
independence requirements at Part III c. infra.  
22  There have been discussions in the recent literature of the proposition of offering rewards to 
gatekeepers that would encourage them to fight fraud. The present paper diverges from these discussions in its 
proposal to use a novel equity-based system to the same end. For other discussions on this issue, see, e.g., Assaf 
Hamdani & Reiner Kraakman, Rewarding Outside Directors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1677 (2007); LAWRENCE A. 
CUNNINGHAM, BEYOND LIABILITY: REWARDING EFFECTIVE GATEKEEPERS (GWU Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 359, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1022360 (suggesting rewards to promote effective capital 
market gatekeeping in lieu of penalties) . 
23  See Coffee, supra note 1, at 202 ("when one pays the CEO with stock options, one creates incentives 
for short-term financial manipulation and accounting gamesmanship"). 
24  There is some similarity to the wide-spread usage of short sales in the markets today.  Short sales make 
markets more efficient by allowing every trader with negative expectations about the market or a certain stock to 
manifest their expectation by selling shares.  The importance of this practice is now well-recognized and most 
recently led to the relaxation of previous restrictions on short sales.  Thus, on July 6, 2007, the SEC revoked 
Rule 10a-1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, commonly known as the uptick rule, which prevented short 
sales in a declining market. See the SEC concept release, Short Sales, Release No. 34-42037, File No. S7-24-99, 
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/34-42037.htm#P49_9887.  
 
 






                                                          
compensating auditors with shares in the corporation they work for.25  This principle 
emanates from the ideal of auditor independence.  However, independence may not be 
sufficient to ensure that auditors counter and thwart corporate fraud.  So-called independent 
auditors receive their compensation from the corporations they are supposed to scrutinize.  
While I do believe that reputation concerns as well as professional ethics and legal liability 
underlie the crucial gatekeeper role played by these auditors, the infamous Arthur Anderson 
case demonstrated the potential inadequacy of these constraints.26 More generally, since 
accounting and auditing standards involve many uncertainties and a fair amount of 
unpublicized information, the quality of much of the auditor’s work is often unverifiable and 
unobservable and, consequently, also protected from legal penalty and even reputation 
backfire.  This paper argues, however, that there is a way to induce auditors to perform their 
task well, even when their efforts are unobservable to outsiders. This would entail stock-
based compensation but not the type that originally led to the legal prohibition on 
compensating auditors with stock or any type of contingent fee arrangement.  Whereas stock-
based compensation for managers may lead them to pursue and back artificially inflated stock 
prices, my proposed scheme for auditors would have the opposite effect, as this paper 
explains.  Negotiations between the auditor and client firm are conducted behind closed 
doors, and both sides have a significant extent of private knowledge regarding the firm, as 
auditors conduct an intensive auditing procedure.  The private and sophisticated nature of this 
interaction and the imprecise nature of the accounting profession to a great degree shield the 
25  Regulation S-X, Rule 2-01, 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01 (2006). See also Ronald A. Dye et al., Contingent Fees 
for Audit Firms, 28 J. ACCT. RES. 239 (1990) (developing the moral hazard argument against contingent auditor 
fees).  See also Sankar De & Pradyot K. Sen, Is Auditor Moral Hazard the Only Reason to Ban Contingent Fees 
for Audit Services?, 1 INT. J. AUDIT. 175 (1997) (discussing reasons for the legal prohibition on auditor 
contingent fees). 
26  See Gideon Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under the PSLRA, 39 CONN. L. 
REV. 1097, 1188-89 (2007); Eric L. Talley, Symposium: Litigation Reform Since the PSLRA: A Ten-Year 
Retrospective: Panel Two: Sarbanes-Oxley Accounting Issues: Cataclysmic Liability Risk Among Big Four 
Auditors, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1663-64 (2006). 
 
 






                                                          
auditor from reputation effects and legal liability. This reality makes the need for adequate 
structuring of auditor incentives even more acute, something that has only intensified since 
executives began to receive compensation in the form of stock options and the like.  Indeed, 
the idea is not only to make auditors independent of management but to also make them 
dependent on the fate of future shareholders who may be harmed by earnings manipulation 
and bad-faith disclosure.  The resulting recommendation is that the regulator (the Securities 
and Exchange Commission) creates a safe harbor for a novel stock-based compensation 
scheme for auditors. 
There are a few ways to craft a stock-based compensation plan for auditors that 
would create incentives to fight inflated share prices.27  In this paper, I introduce one possible 
type of plan that would cause auditors to share the fate of future shareholders who are at the 
risk of buying overpriced shares.  To illustrate, suppose that a corporation announces that it 
has hired a new auditor with a compensation agreement under which the latter (or, 
alternatively, the lead audit partner) agrees to work for the corporation for a maximum 
specified period (say, 3 years),28 during which the auditor (or the lead audit partner) will defer 
a certain fraction of its compensation (say, 50%) until it signs and issues the last audit report 
for the client.  The deferred compensation will be held throughout the period by a trustee who 
will use the money to buy for the auditor (or the lead audit partner) shares in the firm on the 
27  Besides the type of plan discussed in this paper, one could also consider other schemes including 
granting put options to auditors or placing them in a short position on the client's stock.  Each type of plan has a 
different payout structure but they all create incentives to counter inflated share prices (and favor deflated 
prices).  Similar to the market decision to grant executives certain types of stock-based compensation (including 
options, restricted stock, SARs, RSUs etc), the market should also make a decision on the certain type or 
mixture of auditor stock-based compensation.  However, since stock-based compensation for auditors is 
currently illegal, the SEC must craft a safe harbor to allow the usage of such plans.  Given this challenge I 
consider it advantageous from a political economy perspective to pursue the type of plan I highlight in the text 
which hopefully does not create the image of turning auditors into speculators.  
28  Audit partner rotation is in any case an existing legal requirement. Section 203 of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act mandates this practice, providing, "It shall be unlawful for a registered public accounting firm to provide 
audit services to an issuer if the lead (or coordinating) audit partner (having primary responsibility for the audit), 
or the audit partner responsible for reviewing the audit, has performed audit services for that issuer in each of 
the 5 previous fiscal years of that issuer.” 
 
 






                                                          
market following the signing of the last audit report.29  For example, if the market value of 
one share on the day following the release of the last audited report by the issuer is $30, and 
the amount of the deferred compensation is $30 million,30 then the auditor (or the relevant 
audit partner) will receive one million shares.  Moreover, under this compensation scheme, 
the auditor agrees to the restriction that it will not sell the stock for a period ranging between 
18 to 24 months following its purchase (and thus the shares are left in the hands of the trustee 
during that period).  Note that if the auditor sells its entire holdings of the firm's stock, under 
the existing regulation (which I do not suggest modifying), the auditor becomes eligible to be 
reappointed as the firm’s auditor. 
There are unique benefits to this compensation scheme. The auditor fees are 
contingent on its success at preventing financial misreporting. The scheme requires that the 
auditor invest a good portion of its compensation ($30 million in our example) in the stock of 
the corporation it audits.  If the auditor does not adequately perform its duties, the resulting 
financial misreporting may drive the price of the firm’s stock above its bona fide value, and 
consequently, the auditor will overpay for the stock it is compelled to purchase under the 
compensation scheme (paid for with the auditor's deferred compensation). And since the 
shares are restricted and the auditor cannot divest of its holdings upon receipt, information 
regarding the true state of the company may be revealed over time and the stock that the 
29  Alternatively, the deferred compensation would be transferred and held by a trustee who would transfer 
the money back to the issuer in exchange for shares issued to the auditor based on the market price of those 
shares at the time of issuance.  In either case, the trustee's instructions would be that if the issuer collapses prior 
to the date of the stock purchase, then the accrued amount will be released to the auditor in cash.  This safety 
measure would prevent harm to the auditor in extreme scenarios as well as, consequently, a perverse incentive to 
conceal such Enron-like cases from the public. 
30  The above example sets the annual audit fee at $20 million dollars.  In reality, the audit fee varies 
tremendously amongst firms due to several factors such as firm size and complexity.  At the largest and most 
complex U.S. corporations, audit fees and audit-related fees paid to the firm’s certified auditor can exceed $100 
million dollar per year.  See, e.g., AIG Proxy Statement of 2007, at 54 (Form DEF 14A), available at 
http://www.ezonlinedocuments.com/aig/2007/proxy/images/AIG_Proxy2007.pdf (fees paid by AIG in 2006 
were $91.9 million); see also the Audit Fees Section in the GE Proxy Statement of 2007 (Form DEF 14A), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40545/000119312507040510/ddef14a.htm (fees paid by 
GE in 2006 were $106 million). 
 
 





 auditor received in lieu of cash compensation may drop in value. This effect would be 
augmented by the auditor’s exclusion from working for the corporation for as long as the 
auditor does not sell its shares.  The auditor who is no longer actively involved in the firm 
cannot help to maintain the artificial elevation of the stock prices, while, at the same time, the 
new auditor will seek to call its predecessor’s bluff as soon as possible so as not to eventually 
suffer from the inflated prices. 
It should be noted that during the entire period that an auditor works for a 
corporation, the market value of the shares could fluctuate for reasons unrelated to financial 
misreporting.  Thus, the value of the shares in the above example could vary during the 
auditor’s three-year appointment due to firm performance, for better or for worse, as well as 
due to macro-economic factors and frictions that affect the entire market. However, it is 
important to understand that, under the proposed compensation scheme, the auditor does not 
bear risks that stem from such market-value fluctuations, whatever their cause may be.  
Because the auditor receives its deferred compensation in shares based on their market price 
following its period of service for the corporation, previous stock price variations do not 
influence the value of its compensation package in its entirety ($30 million in the above 
example). The amount of shares issued to the auditor will be set with this goal in mind; the 
auditor will receive fewer shares if the price per share increases and vice versa if it drops. 
This means that the auditor bears no investment risk during the period it works for the firm, 
but must still be alert to any misreporting that could inflate the value of the shares and 
possibly hurt its compensation when it eventually does sell its shares.  The proposed scheme 
does, however, involve some risk-related costs for the auditor, which arise during the period 
in which it is required to retain its stock.  Since the auditor is compelled to invest a large sum 
of money in the stock of a single corporation, it will likely demand compensation for this risk, 
 
 






                                                          
leading to higher overall auditor compensation levels than what auditors currently receive in 
cash. 
The larger the auditor and the more firms it works for with a similar compensation 
scheme,31 the lower the premium that it would require for accepting this method of 
compensation.32  Yet, even a substantial premium may be a justified cost when we consider 
the multibillion-dollar price of financial misrepresentation as documented in the literature.  If 
the incentive scheme described in this paper is beneficial, the ensuing ample efficiency gains 
would compensate all parties involved. Moreover, I do not argue that this compensation 
proposal would suit all companies and all gatekeepers. Rather, my point is that there is no 
justification for the existing legal prohibition on all types of stock compensation for auditors 
and that the market should be aware of the possible benefits that may evolve once such 
compensation is allowed. 
Finally, some of the triggers of fraud and misreporting may, in fact, also prevent 
firms from adopting the proposed mechanism.  Misreporting may harm the corporation’s 
future shareholders and creditors while enriching its existing shareholders. This proposal 
should, therefore, be advanced by institutional shareholders and banks, which have large 
stakes of equity and debt that are vulnerable to misreporting and therefore should be driven to 
search for ways to ameliorate the problem.  As we shall see below, it is also important and 
appropriate for the Securities and Exchange Commission to encourage the use of the proposed 
plan by instituting certain exemptions from the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation.  
31  Audit firms, and particularly the so-called “Big Four Firms” (KPMG, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers), are giants with many clients and revenues in the multi-billions. In 2007, each of the 
Big Four had revenues of at least $20 billion. See Big Four Firms Report Tremendous Results (Dec. 4, 2007), 
available at http://bigfouralumni.blogspot.com/2007/12/big-four-firms-report-tremendous-2007.html. 
32  Diversification takes away risks related to the single firms but one cannot diversify away the market 
risk unless the compensation is indexed to some market measure.  For a discussion on market (systematic) risk 
and diversification, see RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, CORPORATE FINANCE 
154-72 (8th ed. 2006).  Still, an auditor could replace its existing portfolio of stock, assuming it holds such 
 
 







The paper progresses as follows. Part II starts out by briefly discussing the 
proliferation of executive stock option plans (and other equity-based compensation) in the 
U.S., the ongoing debate regarding such incentive pay schemes, and how they exacerbate the 
misreporting and overvalued equity problems.  Part III then considers the notion of 
gatekeepers and gatekeeper regulation and, in particular, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provisions 
and the auditor independence requirements.  Part IV proceeds to set out the proposed auditor 
compensation method, explaining why this scheme would respond to the ongoing trends in 
executive compensation practices and how it is compatible with existing gatekeeper 
regulation.  The discussion is wrapped up in Part V. 
 
II. Executive Compensation and Securities Misreporting 
This Part begins with an examination of the surge in executive compensation and the 
revolution in equity-based compensation that caused this leap in executive pay.  It then 
presents the recent and growing body of empirical evidence that links stock-based 
compensation to earning management and financial scandals.33 This conclusive evidence 
constitutes only a small part of a much larger phenomenon of perverse outcomes produced by 
equity compensation, as much of the paltering, whitewashing, and selective reporting is hard 
to detect and verify.  These outcomes may occur in perfectly rational markets but intensify in 
irrational markets that put too much emphasis on accounting presentation. This Part looks at 
some of the enormous body of evidence indicating that our capital markets suffer from such 
irrational episodes and shows that even an optimal compensation scheme would leave a wide 
portfolio as an investment, with the stock generated by the proposed type of compensation and hence bear 
similar risks to the ones it faces without the new compensation scheme. 
33  The literature is also quite clear about the huge social cost that inflated or inaccurate stock prices bring 
about.  See. e.g., Jensen, supra note 13 (discussing how inflated stock prices bring about increased managerial 
agency costs); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Stock Market Driven Acquisitions, 70 J. Fin. Econ. 295 
(2003) (arguing that inflated stock prices bring about inferior acquisitions); Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and 
 
 







opening for misreporting.  In particular, even if managers' incentives are perfectly aligned 
with the incentives of existing shareholders, they may still opt for financial misrepresentation 
at the expense of future shareholders and creditors. This discussion will lead us to Part III, 
which first considers the role and limits of gatekeepers in ameliorating the problem of 
securities misreporting and then turns to the paper’s proposed reform of gatekeeper 
compensation practices. 
 
a. The Growth in Executive Pay and Equity-Based Compensation 
Much has changed since Jensen & Murphy first made their claim in 1990 that 
American CEOs are “paid like bureaucrats.”34 Since the early 1990s, total compensation of 
top executives has more than tripled.35 Between the years 1980 and 1994, the average 
executive compensation rose by 209%,36 and between the years 1992 and 1998, it grew by 
almost threefold, with average compensation to the top five executives in the largest 500 U.S. 
companies climbing from $2,335,000 to $6,549,000.37  The increase in average CEO total 
compensation was even more stunning between 1993 and 2000, going from $3,700,000 to 
$17,400,000, respectively.38 
This striking rise in executive compensation can be attributed in large part to the 
Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 41 Duke L. J. 977 (1992)(discussing the harm that inaccurate share 
prices cause the allocative efficiency of the market). 
34 Jensen & Murphy, supra note 3 (reviewing U.S. executive compensation in the period between 
1969 and 1983); Hall & Liebman, supra note 3, at 655  (reviewing compensation practices of the 400 largest 
public firms and concluding that executives are no longer paid like bureaucrats and that pay is linked to 
performance). 
35  Hall & Murphy, supra note 4 (reporting and discussing executive option grants). 
36. Hall & Liebman, supra note 3 at 655 (reviewing compensation practices of the 400 largest 
public firms and concluding that executives are no longer paid like bureaucrats and that pay is linked to 
performance). 
37. Murphy, supra note 7, at 848 (discussing growth in executive compensation); Susan J. Stabile, 
One For A, Two For B, and Four Hundred For C: The Widening Gap in Pay Between Executives and Rank and 
File Employees, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 115 (2003) (discussing and criticizing growth in executive 
compensation); Todd Perry & Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or 
Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 124 (2000) (same). 
 
 








parallel dramatic increase in option grants to executives.  As already noted, in 1985, the 
value of options granted amounted to only 8% of the average total CEO compensation in the 
largest U.S. companies,39 40 but grew steadily, peaking at 78% in 2000 and 76% in 2001.  
Moreover, whereas in 1980, only 57% of the top executives had held options in their firms, in 
the year 1999 alone, 94% of the largest companies granted options to their executives.41 The 
radical shift in executive pay practices ignited a debate on the efficacy of these new practices. 
Proponents argue that the practice of linking pay to performance is the result of an efficient 
bargain between firms (and, indirectly, the shareholders) and their executives.42 Opponents 
assert, amongst other things, that the outcome is skewed since managers have the power to 
manipulate the pay-setting mechanisms in their favor and thereby ensure that they receive 
much pay without real performance.43 But even under the most optimistic view of stock-
based compensation as encouraging managers to take efforts to guard against harm to the 
firm, the incentives generated by current practices for earning manipulation and securities 
fraud are in no way n
 
b. The Link between Stock-Based Compensation and Financial Misreporting  
A growing body of recent empirical literature is exposing the link between stock-
38 See Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 7, at 285 tbl 1; see also Hall & Murphy, supra note 4, at 
51 (reporting and discussing executive option grants). 
39. See Linda J. Barris, supra note 5, at 64 (an empirical study of 800 public firms). 
40 Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 7, at 290 tbl. 4 (reporting compensation figures for S&P 500 
firms). See also Murphy, supra note 7, at 848 (discussing growth in executive compensation); Brian J. Hall, The 
Six Challenges of Equity-Based Pay Design, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 21, 23 (2003). 
41 See Hall & Murphy, supra note 9, at 4 (reviewing executive compensation in the largest 500 
U.S. firms); see also Kahan, supra note 9, at 1888 (reporting that, in 1996, in a sample of 250 large public firms, 
90% of the companies used stock-option compensation). 
42  John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & David F. Larcker, Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A 
Survey, 9 ECON. POL’Y REV. 27, 28 (2003) ("However, unless beliefs are systematically biased, we expect that 
compensation contracts are efficient, on average, and that average equity incentive levels across firms are 
neither ‘too high’ nor ‘too low.’”). 
43  See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 12 (developing the managerial power approach); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive 
 
 







based compensation for executives and financial manipulation.44 This work is rather new 
since the practice of heavily compensating managers with equity has been around for barely 
fifteen years and it took about a decade for the evidence to mount. Rather than surveying the 
literature in its entirety, I outline below four representative empirical studies in this area, 
portraying the different approaches to the analysis of the evidence. Regardless of the 
approach, however, a rather clear and compelling picture emerges: stock-based compensation 
instigates fraud, earning management, and misreporting in general.45  
The first study focused on accounting restatements and their relation to the structure 
of executive pay.46 An accounting restatement is a remake of previous financial reports that 
occurs when the corporation, its auditor, or the SEC finds significant accounting errors that 
resulted in a substantial misrepresentation in those earlier financial reports.  Cases of 
restatement can be the product of innocent mistakes but are also often indicative of fraud.  
This study found that the likelihood of a misstated financial statement increases greatly when 
Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002) (same); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive 
Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. PER. 71 (2003) (same). 
44  This literature has strong theoretical backing, see, e.g., O. BAR-GILL & L. BEBCHUK, MISREPORTING 
CORPORATE PERFORMANCE (Harvard Olin Discussion Paper No. 400, 2002), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=354141 [hereinafter BAR-GILL & BEBCHUK, MISREPORTING] 
(developing a model of the causes and consequences of misreporting corporate performance); OREN BAR-GILL 
& LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK, THE COSTS OF PERMITTING MANAGERS TO SELL SHARES (2003) (unpublished working 
paper), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/corporate_governance/papers/03.Bar-
Gill.Bebchuk.cost-permitting.pdf [hereinafter BAR-GILL & BEBCHUK, COSTS OF PERMITTING] (analyzing the 
costs of permitting corporate managers to sell shares they hold prior to the end of their service at the company); 
JESSE M. FRIED, CORPORATE LAW'S CURRENT-OWNER BIAS (Berkeley Program in Law & Economics, Working 
Paper Series, Paper No. 181, 2006), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/blewp/art181 (analyzing the effect 
of noisy stock prices on firms' choice of governance arrangements and demonstrating that stock price noisiness 
leads firms to seek arrangements with a current-owner bias); Coffee, supra note 1; John C. Coffee, Jr., What 
Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2004); Jensen, 
supra note 13. 
45  Another recent study related to our discussion focuses on managers' motivations to manipulate 
disclosure in relation to share repurchases and shows that higher equity stakes intensify the problem, PAUL 
BROCKMAN, INDER K. KHURANA & XIUMIN MARTIN, VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AROUND ACTUAL REPURCHASES 
(2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1011922 (showing that managers provide downward-biased 
earnings forecasts before share repurchases and that this opportunistic disclosure strategy intensifies when 
managers have higher equity stakes). See ALSO PAUL BROCKMAN, XUIMIN MARTIN & ANDY PUCKETT, 
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES AND THE EXERCISE OF CEO STOCK OPTIONS (July 9, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1108119 (finding that managers manipulate disclosures around options exercise dates). 
46  Efendi, Srivastava & Swanson, supra note 11.  
 
 







                                                          
the CEO has very sizable holdings of in-the-money options.  Examining restatements 
announced during 2001 and 2002, the study compared a sample of ninety-five restating firms 
with a control sample matched on industry, size, and timeframe.48 The researchers measured 
many factors that could potentially differentiate between the restating firms and the control 
sample, with the most influential factor found to be the CEO’s compensation structure and, 
specifically, the value of the CEO's in-the-money stock options.  The compelling findings 
gained greater force in the specific context of restatements involving major accounting 
irregularities and malfeasance. 
The magnitude of the divergence between the restating firms and their non-restating 
peers is dramatic. The average value of CEO holdings at restating firms was $50,106,370, 
whereas the average for the matched firms was only $8,881,680.49  Moreover, the average 
value of CEO holdings for CEOs at restating firms where there was evidence of accounting 
malfeasance was strikingly higher, at $130,160,680, compared to the average of $14,930,990 
at the matched firms.50 The study also found that restating firm CEOs benefited from the 
misreporting immediately.  CEOs at companies that issued accounting restatements (where 
there was accounting malfeasance) exercised options worth an annual average of $4,181,600 
($7,744,240); this exceeded the average of $436,930 ($2,616,210) at matched firms.51 
Finally, to show that the CEOs did, indeed, benefit from restatement, the study 
clarified that the restatements had inflated the value of the restating companies' stock (or at 
least backed an already-inflated value). Thus, the study found "that restating firms’ returns 
exceed the market by about 20% (27% for firms with accounting malfeasance); in 
47  In-the-money options are options that that have a strike price that is lower than the current market value 
of the company's shares and, thus, if exercised reap an immediate profit.  
48  Many of the restatements had an earning effect. An income effect (always a decrease) occurred in 72 of 
the 95 sample firms (76%). Id. at [19 – in ssrn version]. 
49  Id. at [33 – in ssrn version]. 
50  Id. at [32 – in ssrn version]. 
51  Id. 
 
 






                                                          
comparison, matched control firms receive approximately the market return."52 These 
findings allowed the researchers to comfortably conclude that managers with stock-based 
compensation take action to support the inflated stock price through accounting manipulation. 
A second study similarly concentrated on accounting restatements and their relation to 
executive compensation.53 The study examined firms that announced a restatement of their 
financial statements during the period of 1995 to 2002 and a matched sample of firms that did 
not restate in that same period.54 Like the first study, this research also found that stock 
options bring about aggressive accounting practices, which eventually lead to a proliferation 
of restatements.55 This second study added a novel line of inquiry in measuring the magnitude 
of the restatement and its relation to the structure of manager compensation, finding a positive 
significant relationship between executive compensation sensitivity and the magnitude of the 
restatement. Higher incentives from stock options were found to be not only associated with a 
higher propensity to misreport but also with greater magnitudes of misreporting, as measured 
by the effect of the restatement on the net income of the firm involved.56   
The third study targeted directly cases of securities fraud and linked them to executive 
compensation. Its query, as stated by the authors, was "Do the executives who commit fraud 
face greater financial incentives to do so?"57 The study covered all firms that were the 
52  Id. at [28 – in ssrn version]. 
53  In total, the study gathered a sample of 215 restating firms. Natasha Burns & Simi Kedia, The Impact of 
Performance-based Compensation on Misreporting, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 35 (2006).  
54  Id. at 46. 
55  Id. at 63. 
56  Id. at 43 ("The average effect of the restatement on net income is a reduction of $101.32 million ... . 
The mean (median) effect on net income for restating firms that overstated net income is higher at $117.1 
($13.8) million."). 
57  SHANE A. JOHNSON, HARLEY E. RYAN JR. & YISONG S. TIAN, MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND 
CORPORATE FRAUD: THE SOURCES OF INCENTIVES MATTER (EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings Working Paper No. 1, 
2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=395960. Another recent paper focuses on 
fraud cases and their relation to executive compensation by covering cases that were subject to private securities 
action lawsuits, Ling Peng & Alisa Roell, Executive Pay and Shareholder Litigation, 11 REV. FIN. (forthcoming 
2007), available at http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/rfl003v1; see also David J. Denis, P. Hanouna, & A. 
Sarin, Is There a Dark Side to Incentive Compensation?, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 467 (2006) (finding a significant 
 
 







subjects of the SEC’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (“AAERs”) from 
1992-2001, in which the Commission indicated it believed there to be sufficient evidence of 
accounting fraud to indict the firms or their executives.58 In total, 53 firms (127 fraud years) 
were examined by the study and compared to a matched sample of "innocent" firms,59 and, 
again, the evidence that emerged is compelling: "The unrestricted stock holdings of the 
median fraud executive are 92% greater than those of the median control executive; at the 
75th percentile, the fraud executive has unrestricted stock incentives that are 180% greater 
than those of the control executive."60 Moreover, during fraud years, the study showed that 
executives at fraud firms sell significantly more stock than do control executives.61 
Finally, a fourth study used stock-based compensation and ownership data from the 
period of 1993-2000.62  This study’s contribution to the literature derives from the authors’ 
analysis of firms that meet or just beat analysts' forecasts.  They found a significantly higher 
incidence of meeting or just beating forecasts amongst firms with higher managerial equity 
incentives.63 "[A] one standard deviation increase in unexercisable options increases by 16.3 
percent the odds of meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts, while a one standard deviation 
increase in ownership increases by 30.5 percent the odds of meeting or just beating analysts’ 
positive relationship between the years 1993-2002 between a firm's use of option-based remuneration and 
securities fraud allegations). 
58  Johnson et al., supra note 57, at 6-7.  
59  Id. at 7. 
60  Id. at 2. 
61  Id. at 3. 
62  Qiang Cheng & Terry D. Warfield, Equity Incentives and Earnings Management, 80 ACCT. REV. 441 
(2005).  
63  Id. at 470. See also Mary Lea McAnally, Anup Srivastava & Connie D. Weaver, Executive Stock 
Options, Missed Earnings and Earnings Management: Evidence from Book-Tax Differences, AAA 2007 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING & REPORTING SECTION (FARS) MEETING PAPER (2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=925584 (showing that option grants sometimes encourage 
managers to miss a quarterly earning target intentionally  and that, evidently, firms that miss earning targets have 
larger and more valuable subsequent grants); David Aboody & Ron Kasznik, CEO Stock Option Awards and the 
Timing of Corporate Voluntary Disclosures, 29 J. ACCT. & ECON. 73 (2000) (empirically showing that managers 
time stock grants and disclosure to earn rents).  
 
 






                                                          
forecasts,”64 and "[o]f 4,301 firm-years with equity incentives and earnings surprises in the 
period 1993-2000, 25 percent have zero earnings surprises, i.e., meeting analysts’ forecasts, 
17 percent beat analysts’ forecasts by one cent, but less than nine percent miss analysts’ 
forecasts by one cent."65 Based on analyses that control for firm performance and other 
potential confounds, the authors concluded that their results are more consistent with earnings 
management induced by equity incentives as opposed to improved firm performance. The 
study further showed that managers with high equity incentives sell more shares after meeting 
or beating analysts’ forecasts than after missing analysts’ forecasts. In contrast, it did not find 
any evidence of this for managers with low equity incentives.66 These results, too, conform to 
the notion that there is an increase in stock selling by managers with high equity incentives 
following earnings management.  Lastly, the study found that high equity-incentive managers 
use, on average, more income-increasing accounting techniques (reporting abnormal 
accruals)67 and that managers sell more shares after taking these income-increasing 
measures.68 
From this sampling of recent empirical studies, an unquestionable link emerges 
between financial misreporting and manipulation and the new practice of stock-based 
compensation.  Perhaps pay-for-performance does, indeed, create beneficial incentives to 
improve the firm, but it certainly also creates negative incentives to present a false state of 
firm improvement or to hide adverse information. While there are inherently harsh 
consequences to the incentive to hide adverse information, to whitewash, sugarcoat, twist 
information, or simply lie, the real problem goes even deeper.  For there is significant 
64 Cheng & Warfield, supra note 62, at 455.   
65  Id. at 452.  
66  Id. at 443. 
67  This is especially true for managers with less persistent equity incentives—those who are less 
concerned with the reversal of accruals, id. at 467. 
68  Id.  
 
 






                                                          
evidence that the market is irrational in the sense that it is influenced by the manner of 
accounting representation, even when all the information is accurately described by the 
firm.69 If this is in fact the case, then managers can influence the price of their companies’ 
shares by simply selecting a specific manner of disclosure, without the need to misreport, 
hide, or twist information.  For instance, and related to the studies described above, even the 
manner in which a firm announces its intention to restate its previous financial statements can 
influence the market’s reaction to the restatement.  Accordingly, one study found that 
companies providing a less prominent press release disclosure of their restatement enjoy a 
lower decrease in the value of their shares on the exchange and are less likely to be sued for 
securities fraud.70  This outcome, however, has nothing to do with the severity of the 
accounting irregularity involved or the relevant transparency of the information, but, rather, 
relates simply to the relative prominence of the restatement announcement.71 
There are many other cases that directly involve accounting representations, and 
there is considerable evidence that firms choose income-increasing accounting treatments 
69  The notion that the market is irrational and suffers from behavioral biases, at least for some lengthy 
periods, is now pretty commonly accepted. See, e.g., ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000) (a comprehensive discussion of market inefficiency and 
behavioral biases); Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in HANDBOOK OF THE 
ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1053 (2003) (a survey of the literature on the subject); Owen Lamont & Richard 
Thaler, Can the Market Add and Subtract? Mispricing in Tech Stock Carveouts, 111 J. POL. ECON. 27 (2003) 
(discussing the well-known case of market inefficiency in mispricing firms and their subsidiaries); Bradford 
Cornell & Quiao Liu, The Parent Company Puzzle: When Is the Whole Worth Less Than One of Its Parts? 7 J. 
CORP. FIN. 341(2001). For a discussion of the concept of market efficiency versus irrationality, see Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 782-793 (Steven N. Durlauf & 
Lawrence E. Blume, 2d ed. 2008). 
70  Some firms issue a press release that discloses the restatement in the headline; others give a press 
release headlined by a different subject (for example, earnings news) but discuss the misstatement in the text; a 
third tactic is to simply change the comparative-period amounts reported in an earnings release, with no direct 
mention of the restatement. In all three cases, there are immediately negative stock returns  following the 
announcement but they differ substantially in terms of disclosure prominence (-8.3% for the first type of 
restatement announcement, -4.0% for the second type, and -1.5% for the third group). See EDWARD P. 
SWANSON, SENYO Y. TSE & REBECCA WYNALDA, STEALTH DISCLOSURE OF ACCOUNTING IRREGULARITIES: IS 
SILENCE GOLDEN? (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1004299. 
71  Id. at 30.  
 
 






                                                          
even when these maneuvers are utterly transparent to the market.72  Perhaps the two best-
known examples are the use of the "pooling," versus "purchase," accounting treatment for 
acquisitions and the resistance to expensing employees' stock-option grants.73 Pooling-of-
interest accounting treatment for mergers generally allows firms to report higher income and 
earnings.  For this reason, managers invest much time, effort, and capital to squeeze their 
merger transactions into the mold of the requirements for preferable treatment, and the 
evidence indicates that the market values these choices.74  Since accounting treatment does 
not impact the intrinsic value of these transactions, this managerial behavior and market 
response are telling signs of the market's obsession with accounting numbers rather than with 
fundamental values.  
With regard to expensing stock-option compensation, it took regulators almost 
twenty years to overcome managers’ fierce resistance and enact a requirement to expense 
72  See, e.g., Richard G. Sloan, Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect Information in Cash Flows and Accruals 
About Future Earnings?, 71 ACCT. REV. 289 (1996) (finding that stock prices act as though investors "fixate" on 
earnings, failing to fully reflect information contained in the accrual and cash flow components of current 
earnings until that information impacts future earnings); Charles J.P. Chan, Shimin Chen & Xijia Su, Is 
Accounting Information Value-relevant in The Emerging Chinese Stock Market?, 10 J. INT’L ACCT., AUDITING 
& TAX’N 1 (2001) (reporting fairly convincing evidence that accounting information is value relevant to 
investors in the Chinese market despite the young age of the market and the perception of inadequate accounting 
and financial reporting in China); John R. Hand, Patricia J. Hughes & Stephan E. Sefcik, Insubstance 
Defeasances: Security Price Reactions and Motivations, 64 J. ACCT. & ECON. 587 (1990) (examining stock-
price reactions to the announcement of insubstance defeasances and finding a negative stock price reaction). 
There is also ample evidence that the market does not perfectly adjust to changes in accounting treatment. See, 
e.g., Gary C. Biddle & William E. Ricks, Analyst Forecast Errors and Stock Price Behavior Near the Earnings 
Announcements Dates of LIFO Adopters, 1988 J. ACCT. RES. 169 (1988) (presenting evidence suggesting that 
the negative excess returns were associated with, and possibly due to, analysts' systematic overestimates of 
earnings of firms adopting LIFO in 1974); Kevin C.W. Chen & Michael P. Schoderbek, The 1993 Tax Rate 
Increase and Deferred Tax Adjustments: A Test of Functional Fixation, 38 J. ACCT. RES. 23 (2000) (exploring 
the magnitude and nature of analysts' and investors' functional fixation on reported accounting numbers); John 
R.M. Hand, 1974 LIFO Excess Stock Return and Analyst Forecast Error Anomalies Revisited, 33 J. ACCT. RES. 
175 (1995) (reexamining three LIFO anomalies reported by Ricks & Biddle with the aim of investigating the 
degree of analyst and investor sophistication in responding to fiscal 1974 LIFO adoptions).   
73  Both examples are discussed at length at Fried, supra note 44, at 26-28.  
74  Linda A. Vincent, The Equity Valuation Implications of the Purchase and Pooling Methods of 
Accounting, J. FIN. STATEMENT ANALYSIS 2 (Summer 1997) (finding that pooling firms enjoy an equity 
valuation advantage over purchase firms); P. Hopkins, R. Houston & M. Peters, Purchase, Pooling and Equity 
Analysts’ Valuation Judgments, 75 ACCT. REV. 257 (2000) (providing evidence that analysts' stock-price 
judgments depend on the method of accounting for a business combination and the number of years that have 
elapsed since the business combination).   
 
 






                                                          
stock options.75 Expensing stock-option compensation has a sharp impact on firms' bottom 
line; for example, it would have reduced the earnings of S&P 500 firms in 2001 by 21 
percent.76 However, even without a requirement to expense stock options for accounting 
purposes, managers cannot hide their cost as their value must be disclosed regardless.77 
Nevertheless, it seems that both managers and the market care more about accounting net 
profits than any other type of disclosure that could convey the same information.  This reality 
exacerbates the misreporting problem, as it can drive managers to bend accounting standards 
so as to increase net profits, even when a rational investor would seemingly not be misled by 
such distortion.78 
 
c. Can Executive Pay Reform Solve the Problem? 
Manager pay practices have recently come under attack.79 Some reform proposals 
have been implemented, including those aimed at alleviating managers' perverse incentives to 
manipulate earnings.80  While reforms could possibly remedy part of the problem, two points 
75  Share-Based Payment, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 123R (Fin. Accounting Standards 
Bd. 2004). 
76  See Fried, supra note 44, at 29. 
77  SEC Act Rels. 6940, 51 SEC Dock. 1168 (1992) (proposal); 6962, 52 SEC Dock. 1961 (1992) 
(adoption); 6966, 52 SEC Dock. 2378 (1992) (correction to adoption release); 7032, 55 SEC Dock. 1352 (1993) 
(technical amendments). 
78  The link between irrational markets and managers’ incentives to cheat and take actions to manipulate 
earnings has been widely acknowledged in the literature.  See, e.g., Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, 
Inefficient firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. ECON. 655 (1989) (showing that when 
investors are sophisticated, in equilibrium, investors rationally expect managers to engage in earnings 
management, which they do). See also BAR-GILL & BEBCHUK, MISREPORTING, supra note 44; BAR-GILL & 
BEBCHUK, COSTS OF PERMITTING, supra note 44; Fried, supra note 44; Jensen, supra note 13.  
79  See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 12 (concentrating on the disincentives to improve performance); 
Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 43 (same); Coffee, supra note 44, at 297-98 (discussing perverse 
incentives to manipulate earnings).  
80  For example, the claw-back provision in the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amendment in 
scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.) [hereinafter “SOX”], 15 U.S.C.A. § 7243 (2006) (SOX § 304); timely 
disclosure of equity grants (amendment of section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 
78p) (15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2000)) (SOX § 403); and blackout periods for sales of securities, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 
(2006) (SOX § 306). On blackout periods, see also Kenji Taneda, Sarbanes-Oxley, Foreign Issuers and United 
States Securities Regulation, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 715, 742 (2003); Joseph F. Morrissey, Catching the 
Culprits: Is Sarbanes-Oxley Enough?, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 801, 844 (2003).   
 
 






                                                          
are noteworthy in this context. First, even an ideal compensation contract could not 
overcome the problem in its entirety, and moreover, any reform aimed at solving only part of 
the problem would entail costs of its own. Second, it is important to acknowledge that 
corporations do not have adequate incentive to adopt the optimal pay structure since 
managers' earnings manipulations sometimes benefit existing shareholders at the expense of 
creditors and future shareholders.  These two important points are the background to the 
discussion in Part III, which examines the role of gatekeepers in alleviating the harmful 
incentives that exist for managers to misreport. 
Executive compensation reform can and does alleviate some of managers' negative 
incentives.  A good example of this is the simple solution to the infamous controversy 
surrounding stock option backdating:81 once a requirement of immediate disclosure of grant 
date was introduced under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it became quite hard to play around with 
disclosures and backdate grant dates to a more favorable timing.82 Other reforms could also 
work against managers' incentives to manipulate financial reporting, such as claw-back 
provisions that confiscate profits earned through fraud or accounting errors that lead to 
81  The SEC has launched investigations into more than one-hundred companies with respect to the timing 
and pricing of stock options they granted during the boom years of the late 1990s and early 2000s.  This 
phenomenon has been discussed in numerous papers, see, e.g., LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK, YANIV GRINSTEIN & URS 
PEYER, LUCKY CEOS (Harvard Law & Economics Discussion Paper No. 566, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=945392; LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK, YANIV GRINSTEIN & URS 
PEYER, LUCKY DIRECTORS (Harvard Law & Economics Discussion Paper No. 573, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=952239; David Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic 
Analysis and Observations on the  Stock Option Scandal,  87 B.U. L. REV. 561 (2007); Randall A. Heron, Eric  
Lie & Todd Perry, On the Use (and Abuse) of Stock Option Grants, 63 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 17 (2007). As 
expected, there is evidence that executive equity compensation was a major incentive for the practice of 
backdating. See DANIEL W. COLLINS, GUOJIN GONG & HAIDAN LI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BACKDATING 
OF EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTIONS (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=934881 
(showing that the tendency to backdate is stronger when stock options are more important have greater weight in 
CEO compensation and that firms with weaker governance structures that allow CEOs to exercise greater power 
over the board and its committees are more likely to engage in executive option backdating).  
82  In fact, this is the reason that backdating was exposed in the first place. The passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act reduced managers' returns from option grants dramatically, causing researchers to search for the 
cause of the change. See, e.g., Eric Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. SCI. 802, 805 
n.3 (2005) ("[E]ffective August 29, 2002, the SEC changed the reporting regulations with respect to stock 
option grants. Specifically, firms must now report executive stock option grants within two business days. This 
is likely to affect the timing of stock option grants documented herein."). 
 
 






                                                          
restatements. Along these lines, section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides, "If an 
issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement … as a result of misconduct …, the 
chief executive officer and chief financial officer of the issuer shall reimburse the issuer for—
(1) any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation …; (2) any profits 
realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during that 12-month period."83  
These statutory arrangements and similarly-formulated contractual arrangements 
serve to reduce the incentive to commit fraud, but they are a far stretch from a comprehensive 
solution to the problem. If all fraudulent activities were eventually to be exposed, reputation 
concerns as well as fear of adjudication could prevent most managers from committing 
fraud.84 However, in the absence of this inevitability, managers most often simply hope that 
their actions will go unnoticed.  Managers who inflate profits often hope that income will 
eventually rise, before their fraudulent actions are detected, or alternatively, they hide their 
actions by disclosing a steeper-than-actual fall in sales at a later period.85 While claw-back 
provisions that confiscate manager profits from fraudulent activity (once such activity has 
been exposed) supposedly add another layer of protection against fraud, they do not overcome 
the fundamental hurdle of fraud detection. Moreover, a considerable extent of financial 
reporting manipulation occurs in the gray area. Accounting is based on assessments and 
involves discretion,86 and at times, a number of possible reporting standards can be arguably 
legitimate, with one simply better suited to the financial status of the issuer. This reality of the 
accounting and financial disclosure practice leads to much bending, stretching, slanting, 
83  15 U.S.C.A. § 7243 (2006) (SOX § 304). 
84  On how exposed fraud cases are only the tip of the iceberg, see, e.g., Coffee, supra note 1, at 199 ("one 
suspects that these announced restatements were but the tip of the proverbial iceberg, with many more 
companies negotiating changes in their accounting practices with their outside auditors that averted a formal 
restatement").  
85  See Coffee, supra note 44, at 277 (discussing the concept of misappropriation of future period earnings 
and premature income recognition). 
86  As we will discuss below, accounting practice is moving towards even greater discretion as rules-based 
accounting is being replaced worldwide with principles-based accounting. 
 
 






                                                          
exaggerating, distorting, whitewashing, and selective reporting that do not necessarily result 
in accounting restatements or public exposure of the faulty behavior. 
Another oft-suggested reform proposes setting extended holding periods for 
managers’ equity compensation, based on the notion that earning manipulation and fraud 
cannot last forever.87 Managers can hide a downturn in the firm's profitability or evade 
missing one quarter of analyst expectations, but the real economic situation will eventually 
emerge.88 Lengthy holding periods could, therefore, reduce misreporting incentives since 
short-run deception would not be very profitable for managers. Yet this solution is also far 
from perfect. Any scheme would necessarily have to allow managers to eventually sell their 
shares at some point, thus failing to eliminate all short-run incentives to cook the books.89 
More importantly, however, even if extended holding periods could eliminate much of the 
incentive to misreport, this would not necessarily entail that an optimal employment contract 
would include such a provision. Holding periods expose managers to the fundamental risk of 
fluctuations in the company’s value, and the longer the holding period, the greater the risk 
they bear.90 Since managers' human capital and reputation are already invested in their firms, 
it might be simply excessive to require them to undertake extremely high risks vis-à-vis a 
huge considerable portion of their compensation and capital assets.91 In fact, the empirical 
87  See Coffee, supra note 44, at 308 ("[T]he real problem here is not equity compensation … but rather 
excessive liquidity that allows managers to bail out at will. Only firm-specific answers, such as holding periods 
and retention ratios, seem likely to work effectively to solve this problem.").  
88  This does not mean that short-run misreporting would be exposed as fraud since the firm can often 
postpone the timing of reporting certain economic outcomes for some time without detection. 
89  Theoretically it is possible to require managers to sell their equity stakes only following a certain period 
after they have left the company.  However, risk-averse managers would substantially discount the value of such 
an equity grant, for two reasons: 1) Once the manager has left the firm, she has no control over the business 
performance of the firm, which expose her to the untested skill of the future managerial team. 2) Manager 
turnover is often the result of crises, which would mean that the manager is entitled to sell at times when the 
firm equity is most likely to be worth the least. 
90  For a discussion of the concept of fundamental risk, see Owen A. Lamont & Richard A. Thaler, Can 
the Market Add and Subtract? Mispricing in Tech Stock Carve-Outs, 111 J. POL. ECON. 227, 229 (2003).    
91  See, e.g., Cheng & Warfield, supra note 62, at 444-45 ("Due to these equity-based holdings, managers’ 
wealth is sensitive to their firms’ stock prices and managers therefore bear the idiosyncratic risk of the firm … 
[F]rom the perspective of risk diversification, risk averse managers want to reduce their exposure to the 
 
 







evidence shows exactly just to what extent managers fear holding too much of their firms’ 
equity for a lengthy period of time. One extensive study found that, on average, managers 
sold approximately 680 already-owned shares for every 1000 new options granted and sold 
940 already-owned shares for every 1000 new restricted shares granted.92 These findings 
should serve as a warning sign.  Precluding managers from selling their shares for extended 
periods of time comes at a significant cost, and ameliorating incentives to misreport is not 
justified at any or all costs.93 Moreover, there are other proposed remedies that can and 
should be taken into account, such as the proposal raised in this paper. Indeed, the optimal 
mix of remedies might point to much shorter holding periods than those that are theoretically 
possible.94 
One additional point should be noted. As far as misreporting is concerned, it is far 
from a given that shareholders would want managers to refrain from this practice. Short-term 
inflation in share prices can benefit existing shareholders at the expense of future 
shareholders and creditors.95  Any artificial increase in share value leads to a transfer of value 
between a shareholder who decides to sell her shares and the future shareholder who buys the 
shares; thus, the existing shareholder can benefit from management misreporting while 
idiosyncratic risk of the firm. Consequently, managers want to sell shares if the risk exposure level is higher than 
the equilibrium level … ."). 
92  See Eli Ofek & David Yermack, Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the Evolution of 
Managerial Ownership, 55 J. FIN. 1367, 1376 (1997).     
93  This is perhaps the essence of agency cost theory: one would not want to invest one dollar in 
preventing harm caused by agency relations if such a measure would result in a less than one-dollar reduction in 
residual loss. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 42 (creating the framework of agency cost theory). 
94  The short survey above does not purport to exhaust the flaws in the existing common practices of 
executive compensation.  For instance, one recent study revealed that corporations manipulate the use of 
compensation peer groups by selecting peer firms that will comfortably justify high wages for their own 
executives. See MICHAEL W. FAULKENDER & JUN YANG, INSIDE THE BLACK BOX: THE ROLE AND COMPOSITION 
OF COMPENSATION PEER GROUPS (2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=972197 (showing that firms select highly-paid peers as a 
mechanism to increase CEO compensation). One partial and recent response to this flaw has been the 
requirement to disclose the peer group composition, which was previously a voluntary disclosure, found in 
section 229.201 of the SEC amendments to the disclosure requirements for executive and director compensation, 
17 C.F.R. § 229.201 (2006). 
 
 







enjoying immunity from any direct liability as she does not directly participate in the false 
disclosure.  Moreover, backed with overvalued equity, the firm can raise additional capital by 
issuing shares at an inflated value, thereby diluting the stakes of existing shareholders far less 
than would be the case were issuance set at the accurate price. It is therefore not surprising 
that shareholders lack perfect incentives to counter securities fraud and mechanisms that 
generate such behavior, such as skewed incentive pay programs.96  Similar dynamics in the 
relationship between shareholders and creditors augment shareholder incentive to neglect 
their oversight duty in the context of manager incentive compensation. Incentivizing 
managers to inflate share prices and skew accounting figures can result in a better credit 
rating for the firm and avoidance of default provisions in its debt contracts; both enable the 
firm to finance its operation at a lower cost (relative to accurately disclosing firms) to the 
benefit of its shareholders.  Once again, it is no wonder that shareholders cannot be trusted to 
reform executive pay schemes towards instituting socially optimal incentives for accurate 
disclosure.   
The two hurdles discussed here—namely, that even the optimal compensation 
scheme leaves ample incentive to misreport and that shareholders cannot be relied upon to 
fight for an optimal compensation scheme—raises the role of gatekeepers in capital markets. 
Gatekeepers are assumed to guard against manager incentive to manipulate disclosure, even 
when the shareholder body has abandoned its watch.  The next Part of the paper will discuss 
this role and explain why gatekeepers too often cave in and fail to perform their required 
function. This discussion will lead us, in turn, to a reform proposal, outlined in Part IV. 
 
95  See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict between Current and 











III. The Unfulfilled Promise of Gatekeeper Independence 
Throughout the 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century, auditors failed 
to meet their potential as gatekeepers and did not forestall the massive wave of fraud and 
misreporting.  Given managers' perverse incentives to act fraudulently, discussed in Part II, 
this should come as no surprise. The crises that ensued after the exposure of the fraudulent 
activity spurred aggressive legislation and regulatory responses aimed at improving securities 
disclosure.97 While the benefits of this intervention are debatable, it clearly entails high costs, 
including the sky-rocketing cost of audits.  This Part concludes its discussion with criticism of 
one of the pillars of auditor regulation: the ideal of auditor independence. While it is indeed 
important that auditors enjoy independence from managers, this is not a sufficient condition 
to ensure that they withstand pressure from management to compromise the quality of the 
financial statements. In order to make certain that auditors act to counter managerial 
incentives to inflate earnings and hide adverse events, their incentives must be calibrated in a 
radical manner, as a mirror-image of the managerial incentives.  This discussion will lead us 
to the reform proposal presented in Part IV. 
 
a. Crises and Failure  
The term gatekeepers, which was adopted by jurists in the late 1980s98 and has since 
maintained its appeal in the corporate governance discourse,99 refers to certain agents, such as 
96  In Fried's terms, this shareholder tendency leads to a "current owner bias" in corporate law. Fried, 
supra note 44.  
97  See Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 
38 Conn. L. Rev. 393 (2006) (an historical survey demonstrating that stock market bubbles almost invariably 
coincide with epidemics of securities fraud and, in turn, enhanced regulation). 
98  Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 53 (1986).  
99  John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 
84 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2004) (presenting gatekeepers' failure as an alternative explanation for the wave of 
accounting and financial reporting irregularities that surfaced in 2001-2002); John C. Coffee, The Attorney as 
Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (2003) [hereinafter Coffee, The Attorney as 
 
 







auditors and legal counsel, who are in a position to prevent corporate wrongdoing, including 
misreporting. Given the negative incentives of management and the inability of manager 
compensation schemes to overcome this problem, gatekeepers have a sacrosanct role in 
corporate governance. Since they are not affected by the same perverse incentive structures 
that drive corporate insiders and given their reputation concerns and deep pockets, 
gatekeepers are expected to stand up to opportunistic behavior.  It is no secret, however, that 
gatekeepers failed to live up to their promise when they did not safeguard the capital markets 
against the corporate fraud surge of the late 1990s and early twenty-first century.100 During 
the same period that executive pay skyrocketed, there was a veritable explosion in accounting 
restatements, a central symptom of financial irregularity.  From an annual average of about 50 
public company restatements in the period of 1990 to 1997,101 the number rose to 201 in 2000 
and to 225 in 2001,102 the year before the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. 
Together, this amounted to an unimaginable volume of 1 in every 10 U.S. public firms issuing 
at least one restatement between 1997 and 2002.103  Some argue that the actual number of 
Gatekeeper] (claiming that securities attorneys can and do perform a limited gatekeeping function); Hamdani & 
Kraakman, supra note 22 (comparing two possible legal regimes of outside directors outside directors’ rewards 
and liability. The gatekeeper term was adopted also by the Securities and Exchange Commission, see, e.g., 
Securities Act Release No. 7870 (June 30, 2000) 2000 SEC LEXIS 1389 ("the federal laws… make independent 
auditors 'gatekeepers' to the public securities markets"). 
100  This notion is the essence of Coffee’s paper, What Caused Enron?, Coffee, supra note 44. The 
previous title of an earlier version of the same paper, Understanding Enron: It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid, 
reflected the notion well, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., UNDERSTANDING ENRON: IT'S ABOUT THE GATEKEEPERS, STUPID 
(Columbia Law & Economics Working Paper No. 207, 2002), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=325240. See also Coffee, The Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra 
note 99. 
101  George B. Moriarty & Philip B. Livingston, Quantitative Measures of the Quality of Financial 
Reporting, 17 FIN. EXECUTIVE 53, 53-54 (2001). 
102  U.S. Gen. Acct. Office, Financial Statement Restatements: Trends, Market Impacts, Regulatory 
Responses, and Remaining Challenges, Rep. No. GAO-03-138, at 12 (October 2002), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03138.pdf [hereinafter GAO, Financial Restatements]. But cf. KAREN M. 
HENNES, ANDREW J. LEONE & BRIAN P. MILLER, THE IMPORTANCE OF DISTINGUISHING ERRORS FROM 
IRREGULARITIES IN RESTATEMENT RESEARCH: THE CASE OF RESTATEMENTS AND CEO/CFO TURNOVER (2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com /abstract=948929 (a cautionary note on the importance of distinguishing bona fide 
errors from irregularities in  the GAO database on restatements). 
103  Id. at 4.  
 
 






                                                          
restatements was even higher and in fact grew tenfold from 1990 to 2000.104 Recall also that 
restatements are only required in cases of the most acute form of accounting failure. Many, if 
not most, of the accounting schemes and sugarcoating cases simply go unnoticed or fail to 
reach the extreme of requiring a restatement.  
 In any event, this syndrome had devastating effects on the American market.105  The 
federal government’s accountability office estimated at least $100 billion in total market 
losses for restating firms;106 and one academic study showed that its sampled restating firms 
had lost, on average, no less than 25% of their market value.107  Yet these numbers, too, are 
an understatement of the real loss.  There was a reasonable belief amongst investors that not 
all cases of fraud and financial irregularity had been exposed.108  Indeed, one study showed 
that accounting restatements that adversely affect shareholder wealth at the restating firm also 
induce share price declines among non-restating firms in the same industry.109 Moreover, 
these latter declines were found to be linked to factors in the accounting quality in the 
sampled firms.  Thus, for instance, non-restating firms using the same external auditors as the 
restating firms or non-restating firms with high discretionary accounting accruals experienced 
104  The evidence is summarized in Coffee, supra note 1, at 201. 
105  The discussed outcomes underestimate the amount of fraud that was going on.  One significant, 
scandalous matter that was uncovered only a few years later was the stock–option backdating that took place at 
the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century. See Walker, supra note 81, at 563: "In the 
year since the scandal was uncovered, the SEC has launched investigations into suspicious timing and pricing of 
stock options granted during the go-go years of the late 1990s and early 2000s at more than one hundred 
companies… recent papers suggest that this figure represents only the tip of the iceberg—that perhaps 10% to 
20% of options issued to senior executives during this period may have been backdated in order to reduce option 
exercise prices." 
106  GAO, Financial Restatements, supra note 102, at 24.  
107  SCOTT A. RICHADRSON, A. IREM TUNA & MIN WU, PREDICTING EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: THE CASE OF 
EARNINGS RESTATEMENTS 16 (2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 338681. 
108  Fraud and financial misrepresentation cases that were exposed and subject to enforcement action are 
reported in JONATHAN M. KARPOFF, D. SCOTT LEE & GERALD S. MARTIN, THE LEGAL PENALTIES FOR 
FINANCIAL MISREPRESENTATION (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=933333 (proving an integrated 
analysis of private and regulatory penalties for financial misrepresentation).  
109  CRISTI A. GLEASON, NICOLE THORNE JENKINS & W. BRUCE JOHNSON, THE CONTAGION EFFECTS OF 
ACCOUNTING RESTATEMENTS (AAA 2005 FARS Meeting Paper, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=591689 (predicting and finding that accounting restatements that adversely affect 










                                                          
a sharper drop in share prices than other non-restating firms.110  Together, the direct and 
indirect outcomes of financial fraud and misreporting contributed to the crash of U.S. capital 
markets, which, during the years 2001 to 2002, plummeted by 32 percent.111 Congress acted 
swiftly in response to these events, with, as one scholar explained, "the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 understandably focus[ing] on gatekeepers."112 
  
b. The Costs and Limits of the Sarbanes-Oxley Legislation 
 As noted, the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act has both its critics and proponents.  There can 
be no doubt, however, about the huge costs this legislation entails.  Since the objective of this 
paper is to propose reform aimed at improving gatekeeper performance, it is important to 
understand in what ways it diverges from the reform introduced by Sarbanes-Oxley.  Indeed, 
the Act prescribed several new requirements relating to gatekeepers, placing great, albeit not 
exclusive,113 emphasis on auditors.  To compare between the reform proposed in this paper 
and the Act, the discussion will focus on some of the latter’s provisions that address auditors 
and, more broadly, the preparation of financial statements.114 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act constitutes the consolidation of a series of corporate 
governance initiatives and new disclosure requirements that were incorporated into the 
110  Id. at 18.  
111  Bengt Holmstron & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of US Corporate Governance: What's Right and 
What's Wrong, 15 J, APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8 (2003) 
112  Coffee, supra note 1, at 204. 
113  Another important gatekeeper targeted by the Act is the corporate lawyer, Rules of Professional 
Responsibility For Attorneys, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (2006) (SOX § 307); see also Coffee, The Attorney as 
Gatekeeper, supra note 99. 
114  One provision in the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation not discussed below is the section that created a new 
public board to oversee auditors (“PCAOB”), in effect establishing a new regulator directed exclusively at the 
auditing profession.  See Inspections of Registered Public Accounting Firms, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7214 (2006) (SOX 
§ 104).  It is hard to measure the costs and benefits of this new institution whose main function is to conduct 
inspections of every registered public accounting firm. See HELEN M. ROYBARK, AN ANALYSIS OF AUDIT 
DEFICIENCIES BASED ON PCAOB INSPECTION REPORTS ISSUED DURING 2005 (2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008206 (compiling data from PCAOB findings over the years 2004-2005). Other 
relevant and important provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act address audit partner (and audit firm) rotation, 15 
 
 







federal securities laws alongside enhanced disclosure requirements.115  One measure 
introduced by the Act, discussed in the context of the limits of executive pay reform, is the 
claw-back provision, which requires the forfeit of compensation gained through fraud or 
misreporting.116 Another important provision relating to financial reporting is the section 301 
requirement that all public companies have an audit committee composed entirely of 
independent directors.117  Since the audit committee is a sub-committee of the board that 
oversees the corporation’s relationship with its auditor, this requirement was aimed at 
improving the monitoring of management in the context of financial disclosure.  While such a 
requirement is not necessarily a bad idea, the empirical literature has raised doubts as to 
whether audit committees with independent directors can actually overcome management's 
biased incentives vis-à-vis disclosure. 
 In U.S. firms, corporate boards, including audit sub-committees, are already packed 
with independent directors.118 Moreover, the evidence has always been inconclusive with 
regard to the connection between board independence and firm performance.119  To attack the 
U.S.C. § 78j-1(j) (2006) (SOX § 203); 15 U.S.C.A. § 7232 (2006) (SOX § 207), which are analyzed in infra 
Part IV as part of the discussion of the present paper’s proposed reform. 
115  An example of an enhanced disclosure requirement is the treatment of off-balance-sheet transactions, 
15 U.S.C.A. § 7261 (2006) (SOX § 401(a)). 
116  See supra Part II.c.  
117  15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(3)(A) (2006) (SOX § 301. In addition, section 407 of SOX requires disclosure of 
the financial expertise of the members of the audit committee and an explanation, if relevant, for any lack of 
such expertise, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7265 (2006) (SOX § 407). See also LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, REDISCOVERING 
BOARD EXPERTISE: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE (GWU Law School Public Law 
Research Paper No. 363, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024261 (showing that the Sarbanes-
Oxley requirement led firms to appoint more directors with financial expertise, especially to the audit 
committee, and that this measure (in particular when the expertise involved was accounting expertise) enhances 
firm performance). 
118  JEFFREY N. GORDON, INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AND STOCK MARKET PRICES: THE NEW CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE PARADIGM (Columbia Law & Economics Working Paper No. 301, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=928100 (showing that over the 1950-2005 period, the composition of large public 
company boards dramatically shifted towards independent directors, from 20% to 75%, and arguing that 
independent directors have become a complementary institution to an economy of firms directed at maximizing 
shareholder value). 
119  Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm 
Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999) (a survey of the literature on board independence); Roberta Romano, 
Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, 5 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 277 (1996) (same). 
 
 






                                                          
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation,120 Romano turned to the findings of sixteen different studies on 
the link between audit committee independence and firm performance (including audit 
quality): the overwhelming majority showed no link between total independence of the audit 
committee members and performance.121  The findings were even mixed as to whether a 
majority of independent directors on a committee (the prevailing situation prior to the Act) 
has any effect on firm performance.122  These findings are hardly surprising in light of the 
arguments made in this paper.  Independent directors do not have any intimate knowledge of 
the firm's financial status.  As will be discussed at the beginning of Part IV, auditor-client 
negotiations over the financial statements are conducted between two highly sophisticated 
and knowledgeable parties: the CFO and her staff on the one side and the audit partner and 
her staff on the other.123 To truly improve the outcome of these negotiations, auditors' 
incentives must be addressed directly, as suggested in this paper.  This is at least one good 
way to effectively counter executives’ perverse incentives, which are driven by the new 
model of executive incentive pay. 
 A third important provision in the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation is the requirement for 
executive certification of financial statements and the institution of internal controls. The 
CEO and CFO of listed firms must certify that their firm's periodic reports fairly represent its 
financial condition and results of operations.124  This requirement alone does not seem 
impressive in itself, as these executives had always signed the company's reports and had 
120  Romano's criticism is based, at least in part, on her general view that one set of norms cannot possible 
suit all corporations. See, e.g., SANJAI BHAGAT, BRIAN J. BOLTON & ROBERTA ROMANO, THE PROMISE AND 
PERIL OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDICES (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1019921 (empirically 
showing that corporate governance is an area where a regulatory regime of ample flexibility across firms is 
particularly desired). 
121  See Romano, supra note 17, at 1604 tbl. 4. 
122  Id. at 1532.  
123  For the non-verifiable nature of the outcomes of auditor-client negotiations over financial statements, 
see ABIGAIL B. BROWN, INCENTIVES FOR AUDITOR COLLUSION IN PRE-SARBANES-OXLEY REGULATORY 
ENVIRONMENT (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=976169 (explicitly modeling the possibility of 
 
 







been subject to liability under securities laws.125 Its significance, rather, lies in the duty it 
imposes on CFOs and CEOs to establish and maintain internal controls that can attest to the 
verity of the financial reports and the executives' certification thereof.  Section 404 of the Act 
augments this requirement with an additional requirement, to file a report assessing the firm’s 
internal controls, which must include confirmation from the external auditor.126 
 While these seemingly benign measures may have indeed improved the quality of 
disclosure,127 they have also imposed huge costs.  One survey estimated that the cost of 
compliance with the certification requirement in terms of audit fees, external consulting, and 
software expenses would add up to about $2.9 million in additional fees for companies with 
revenues of over $5 billion;128 a more recent empirical work has showed that the certification 
requirement alone practically doubled the relevant fees for the sampled firms.129 In fact, the 
total costs of compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation are much higher, with one 
report finding an almost 350%TT increase in audit fees between 2001 and 2006.130 And these 
out-of-pocket expenses are certainly not an exhaustive list of the costs of compliance. In 
addition to the direct audit fees, consulting fees, software costs, increased insurance, and 
collusion between manager and outside auditor in a context where the outcome of the auditor-client negotiations 
is  unverifiable). 
124  15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006) (SOX § 302).  
125  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007); see also 3 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 
199-207 (5th ed. 2005).  
126  In its report, the registered public accounting firm must express an opinion concerning management's 
assessment of the effectiveness of the firm's internal control over financial reporting, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006) 
(SOX § 404). 
127  The empirical data on this issue do not necessarily support the efficacy of these requirements, see 
Romano, supra note 17, at 1541-42 (summarizing the empirical literature and criticizing the certification 
requirement). But cf. PETER ILIEV, THE EFFECT OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT (SECTION 404) ON AUDIT FEES, 
ACCRUALS AND STOCK RETURNS (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=983772 (showing that the 
requirement for a certification report induced managers to cut back on discretionary accruals). 
128  The survey conducted by the Financial Executive International organization is summarized in Romano, 
supra note 17, at 1587-88. 
129  Iliev, supra note 127 (showing that firms with a public float of about $75 million dollars incurred 
double their previous annual audit fees amount due to the certification requirement, with audit fees rising on 
average from $370,700 to $882,300). 
130  According to a recent report from the Corporate Library, the median increase in audit fees between 










                                                          
additional outside directors fees,131 there are indirect costs, from simple business disruption 
and increased rates of firms going private132 to less frequent M&A activity due to fear of 
compliance problems in newly acquired divisions.133  It is therefore hardly surprising that a 
recent study showed that U.S. firms experienced statistically significant negative abnormal 
returns around key Sarbanes-Oxley legislation events.134 
 A positive account of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act might explain that these costs are worth 
the benefits produced by the legislation.  For instance, one recent study showed that the 
proportion of securities fraud uncovered by auditors has risen substantially in the post 
Sarbanes-Oxley era.135  Prior to the legislation, auditors were responsible for only 7.2% of all 
cases of exposed securities fraud, whereas subsequently, this increased impressively to 
28.9%.136 Before proceeding to Part IV, which proposes a new method of improving 
disclosure and audit quality, perhaps at a much lower cost, one final provision of Sarbanes-
Oxley should be examined, namely, that aimed at ensuring the principle of auditor 
131  JAMES S. LINCK, JEFFRY M. NETTER & TINA YANG, EFFECTS AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT, AND ITS ERA, ON THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR DIRECTORS (AFA 2006 Boston 
Meetings Paper, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=902665, found that with the legislation of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the size of boards and proportion of independent directors on those boards have increased 
significantly. This increase in the size of boards implies additional directors' fees, as well as also possibly 
entailing the cost of harm to the board's ability to act as a monitoring mechanism.  See, e.g., David Yermack, 
Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 193 (1996) (finding 
"an inverse association between board size and firm value in a sample of 452 large U.S. industrial corporations 
between 1984 and 1991"). 
132  See, e.g., EHUD KAMAR, PINAR KARACA-MANDIC & ERIC L. TALLEY, GOING PRIVATE DECISIONS AND 
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002: A CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS (USC CLEO Research Paper No. C06-5, 
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=901769 (finding that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act caused small-size 
firms to go private); Stanley B. Block, The Latest Movement to Going Private: An Empirical Study, 14 J. 
APPLIED FIN. 36 (2004) (surveying firms going private and their motivation for doing so). 
133  This fear exists when the contemplated object of acquisition is a foreign firm or a closely held firm that 
has never withstood a compliance test. 
134  See IVY ZHANG, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (Feb. 1, 2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=961964 (an event-study investigation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act examining 
market reactions to related legislative events). 
135  I.J. ALEXANDER DYCK, ADAIR MORSE & LUIGI ZINGALES, WHO BLOWS THE WHISTLE ON CORPORATE 
FRAUD? (AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =891482 (reviewing a 
sample of 230 cases of corporate fraud between 1996-2004). 
136  Id. at 67 tbl. 13.  See also MARY ELLEN CARTER ET AL., CHANGES IN BONUS CONTRACTS IN THE POST-
SARBANES-OXLEY ERA (2007), available at http://accounting.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/carter/clz_111507.pdf  
(showing that Sarbanes-Oxley and related reforms led to a decrease in earnings management and that firms 
responded by placing more weight on earnings in bonus contracts). 
 
 






                                                          
independence.137 
 
c. The Auditor Independence Requirement in Sarbanes-Oxley and Beyond 
 A central provision in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which addresses an issue that lay at the 
heart of the legislative deliberation,138 is the prohibition on accounting firms to provide the 
majority of non-auditing services to the firms they audit.139 This provision led to sweeping 
change in the practices prevailing at the time of its legislation. For instance, in 2000, GE paid 
its auditor KPMG LLP $23.9 million for audit fees, $11.5 million for information system 
design and implementation, $13.8 million for tax services, $15.5 million for due diligence 
procedures associates with M&A activity, and $38.9 million for "all other services consisting 
primarily of information technology consulting … not associated with financial 
statements."140 In 2005, there was a drastic shift as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley prohibition, 
with GE paying the same auditor $73.3 million in audit fees and audit-related fees, but only 
$6.5 million in tax fees and $2.5 million in all other fees.141 
137  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act cannot be blamed for all of the costs that emerge from U.S. financial 
regulation, for the United States has over 115 federal and state agencies that are involved in regulating some 
aspect of financial services, with Congress contemplating adding new agencies to the list. ELIZABETH F. BROWN, 
THE TYRANNY OF THE MULTITUDE IS A MULTIPLIED TYRANNY: IS THE UNITED STATES’ FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
STRUCTURE UNDERMINING U.S. COMPETITIVENESS? (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008969.  
138  Romano, supra note 17, at 1549. 
139  See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (2006) (SOX § 201) (adding section 10A (g) of the 1934 Securities Exchange 
Act). The full list of banned non-audit services now appears in Regulation S-X, Rule 2-01(c)(4), 17 C.F.R. 
210.2-01(c)(4) (2006). 
140  See the Independent Auditor Fees section in the 2001 General Electric Proxy Statement, Form DEF 
14A, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40545/000095013001001223/0000950130-01-
001223.txt. 
141  See the audit fees section in the 2007 General Electric Proxy Statement, Form DEF 14A, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40545/000119312507040510/ddef14a.htm. This is by no means a 
unique phenomenon.  As a comparison, the 2000 Microsoft expenditure on audit fees was $4.7 million, and 
$14.7 million in other fees were paid to its audit firm, see the 2001 Microsoft Proxy Statement, Form DEF 14A, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/789019/000103221001501143/ddef14a.htm. In contrast, in 
2006, Microsoft expended $16.4 million on audit fees, with only $0.8 million paid to its auditor for tax services 
and $0.7 million for all other services, see 2007 Microsoft Proxy Statement, Form DEF 14A, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/789019/000119312507205208/ddef14a.htm. A similar shift occurred in 
General Motors: in 2000, it paid $17 million in audit fees, $2 million for financial information systems design, 











 The rationale for this prohibition was that non-audit services can generate high fees, 
the prospect of which, in turn, can compromise the external auditor’s diligence in performing 
its task.142 This logic fits with a concept that is almost sacred in securities regulation: auditor 
independence.143 Critics of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act argue that there is voluminous empirical 
literature showing that, by and large, not much improvement in audit quality can be achieved 
with the new restriction.144 This paper takes an entirely different approach: Independence is 
simply not enough.  Instead of fine-tuning the concept of auditor independence, as Sarbanes-
Oxley attempted, the focus should be on shaping incentives that rest on the quality of the 
auditor’s work. 
 The principal of auditor independence is anchored in the preamble to the regulation 
prescribing auditor qualifications:  
Rule 2-01 is designed to ensure that auditors are qualified and independent of their  
audit clients both in fact and in appearance. Accordingly, the rule sets forth 
restrictions of financial, employment, and business relationships between an 
accountant and an audit client and restrictions on an accountant providing 
certain non-audit services to an audit client.145 
 
The simple yet fundamental limitation of this extensive independence requirement is that it 
fails to provide an affirmative incentive for auditors to counter fraud and improve the quality 
of disclosure. Any independence requirement will merely reduce auditor incentives and 
2006, GM paid $50 million in audit fees, $12 million in audit-related fees, $7 million in tax fees, and only $4 
million in "all other fees," see 2007 General Motors Proxy Statement, Form DEF 14A, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40730/000089016307000284/s11-7040_def14a.htm.  
142  The empirical work on the subject prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation clearly shows that the non-
audited services provided by the audit firm generated much of its total income.  See FERDINAND A. GUL, BIKKI 
JAGGI & GOPAL V. KRISHAN, AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE: EVIDENCE ON THE JOINT EFFECTS OF AUDITOR TENURE 
AND NON-AUDIT FEES 11-12 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=984656 ("The mean (median) of audit 
fees is $0.59 ($0.22) million, whereas the mean (median) of nonaudit fees is $1.34 ($0.23) million 
respectively."). 
143  Indeed, in 2000, certain non-audit services were already banned by the SEC on the rationale that they 
compromise auditor independence. See Romano, supra note 17, at 1534. 
144  The empirical literature is discussed and analyzed extensively in Romano, supra note 17, at 1536-37. 
Audit quality is measured by a variety of variables, including abnormal and discretionary accruals, earnings 
surprises, variables related to earnings conservatism, financial restatements, and the issuance of qualified audit 
opinions, id. at 1535. 
145  See the preliminary note to Regulation S-X, Rule 2-01, 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01 (2006). 
 
 






                                                          
inclination to favor executives.146 But any residual tendency on the part of auditors to favor 
executives, if for the sole reason that they belong to the same socio-economic group of 
reference, could substantially compromise auditor performance in the absence of any 
countervailing incentive to fight manipulation and disorder in the firm.  Auditor 
independence, therefore, cannot be relied upon to counter the social and psychological forces 
that may cause auditors to favor managers over the amorphous group of constituents that are 
harmed by imprecise disclosure.147 Simply put, the auditor bears no immediate and real costs 
if she chooses to act collegially and avoid conflict. 
  As explained in Part IV below, negotiations between the auditor and the firm-client 
are conducted behind closed doors, and both sides have a significant extent of private 
knowledge regarding the firm, since the auditors conduct an intensive auditing procedure.  
The private and sophisticated nature of this interaction and the imprecise nature of the 
accounting profession to a great degree shield the auditor from reputation backfire and legal 
liability.148 This reality heightens the need for an adequate structuring of auditor incentives, 
something that has only intensified since executives began to receive compensation in the 
form of stock options and the like.  Indeed, the idea is to make auditors not only independent 
146  This claim follows closely the lines of Bebchuk & Fried's argument for the insufficiency of the 
requirement of outside director independence. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 12, at 203. Given auditors’ 
professional skills, which may assist them in countering executives’ negative incentives to manipulate earnings, 
this argument becomes increasingly important in relation to auditors. 
147  One of these psychological forces is the self-serving bias that causes people to overlook matters that 
can cause then disutility and, in our case, the necessity to engage in a conflict with management. See Jon D. 
Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 649 (1999) (describing an experiment in which students who were designated as either 
plaintiff or defendant were asked to make an objective assessment of the monetary judgment in the case, with 
assessments of students designated as plaintiffs emerging as much higher than those of students designated as 
defendants, although both groups considered the same case). See generally Norbert L. Kerr, Robert J. MacCoun 
& Geoffrey P. Kramer, Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687 (1996) 
(discussing the operation of the self-serving bias in groups).  One should also keep in mind that social 
interactions and connections often translate into financial gain.  Hence, a person would prefer to maintain a good 
relationship with an influential executive rather than make enemies in so-called corporate America. 
148  Beyond the evidentiary difficulties, the conceptual possibility of auditors’ bearing legal liability is 
tenuous in the U.S. to begin with.  See the discussion at infra Part IV.c. For a comparison of auditors' legal 
liability in the U.S. and U.K. respectively, see generally TIM BUSH, STELLA FEARNLEY & SHYAM SUNDER, 
 
 







of management but also dependant on the fate of future shareholders who may be harmed by 
earnings manipulation and bad-faith disclosure. 
 
IV. The Gatekeeper's Option: Towards a New Format of Gatekeeper Compensation 
Any outsider to the corporate world who happens to read an audit opinion affirming 
the financial statements of a given corporation is bound to get the wrong impression. For a 
literal reading of a typical audit opinion would wrongly imply that corporate insiders had 
produced the financial statements and that the audit firm, in turn, had conducted its audit and 
verified whether those financials accurately represent the financial status of the firm and its 
operations according to generally accepted accounting principles.149 One example of the 
typical format of an auditor’s opinion can be found in Yahoo’s unqualified audit report and 
similarly appears in thousands of other reports:  
In our opinion, the consolidated financial statements listed in the accompanying 
index present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of 
Yahoo! Inc. and its TTsubsidiaries … . These financial statements and financial 
statement schedule are the responsibility of the Company's management. Our 
responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements and 
financial statement schedule based on our audits.150 
 
Nothing could be farther from the truth than this literal depiction of the essence of the 
auditing process.  In reality, corporate insiders, chiefly the CFO and her staff151 (although, 
AUDITOR LIABILITY REFORMS IN THE UK AND THE US: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW (2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1011235 (discussing reforms in auditor liability regimes).  
149  The Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm attached to Yahoo Inc., 2004 Annual 
Report (2004), available at http://www.secinfo.com/dVut2.z62k.htm?Find=3721&Line=4519#6yya. See also 
The Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm, attached to General Motors Corp. 2007 Annual 
Report (2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40730/000095012407001502/k11916exv23.htm and The Report of 
Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm attached to Microsoft Corp. 2007 Annual Report (2007) 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/789019/000119312507170817/d10k.htm.  
150  See the Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm attached to Yahoo Inc., 2004 
Annual Report (2004), supra note 149.  
151  Michael Gibbins, Susan A. McCracken & Steve S. Salterio, The Chief Financial Officer’s Perspective 
on Auditor-Client Negotiations, 24 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 387 (2007) ("CFOs are the managers responsible for 










                                                          
interestingly enough, not the members of the audit committee),152 negotiate with the audit 
partner and her staff over the numbers and any other feature of the financial statements.153  
There is nothing wrong with this practice. Insiders are typically biased in their firm’s favor, 
both knowingly and subconsciously leaning towards smooth and positive numbers and 
representations,154 whereas auditors are professionals led by ethics and reputation concerns 
and therefore typically counterbalance insiders' incentives.  And since financial reporting 
involves a great deal of evaluations, contingencies, appraisals, interpretations, and discretion, 
there is much to negotiate.  Moreover, it is extremely hard to determine from the outside 
whether the financial statements that were produced at the end of these negotiations actually 
constitute a fair representation of the corporation’s financial position.155  Put differently, the 
152  There is mounting evidence that audit committee plays a passive role in resolving accounting disputes 
with the auditor.  See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Cohen et al., AUDITOR EXPERIENCES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE 
POST SARBANES-OXLEY ERA (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1014029 (showing that usually the 
auditor and the management try to resolve issues before they come to the attention of the audit committee); see 
BRADLEY POMEROY, AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBER INVESTIGATION OF SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING DECISIONS 
(June 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=962783 (stating that recent research suggests that audit 
committee members are not involved in material auditor-client negotiations and that they are often no even 
informed that accounting decisions were negotiated). 
153  This common and inevitable practice is documented in a large body of literature. See, e.g., Michael 
Gibbins, Susan McCracken & Steve S. Salterio, Negotiations Over Accounting Issues: The Congruency of Audit 
Partner and Chief Financial Officer Recalls, 24 AUDITING: J. THEORY & PRACTICE 171 (2005) (collecting data 
on accounting auditor-client negotiations as viewed from the audit partner's and CFO’s perspectives); Michael 
Gibbins, Steven Salterio & Alan Webb, Evidence About Auditor-Client Management Negotiation Concerning 
the Client’s Financial Reporting, 39 J. ACCT. RES. 535 (2001) (developing a model of auditor-client accounting 
negotiations and demonstrating important aspects of the sampled accounting negotiations); Gibbins, McCracken 
& Salterio, supra note 151 (reporting a sample of Canadian CFOs’ views on the negotiation process with the 
audit firm); R.C. HATFIELD, C.P. AGOGLIA & M.H. SANCHEZ, THE EFFECT OF CLIENT CHARACTERISTICS ON THE 
NEGOTIATION TACTICS OF AUDITORS (Working Paper, Drexel University, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=892465 (empirically studying different negotiation strategies); Terence Bu-Peow Ng & 
Hun-Tong Tan, Effects of Authoritative Guidance Availability and Audit Committee Effectiveness on Auditors’ 
Judgments in an Auditor-Client Negotiation Context, 78 ACCT. REV. 801 (2003) (showing that auditors' 
perceived negotiations' outcome is influenced by audit committee effectiveness); Ken T. Trotman, Arnold M. 
Wright & Sally Wright, Auditor Negotiations: An Examination of the Efficacy of Intervention Methods, 80 
ACCT. REV. 349 (2005) (examining the effectiveness of three pragmatic intervention methods for enhancing 
auditor negotiation performance). 
154  Millstein noted even prior to the market crash in the early 2000s that "[t]he current concern with 
financial reporting is primarily fueled by a perceived need for corporations to constantly ‘make the numbers’—
to match or exceed analysts' expectations and projections." Ira M. Millstein, Introduction to the Report and the 
Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit 
Committees, 54 BUS. LAW. 1057, 1059 (1999).  
155  See Gibbins, supra note 153 ("Much of what takes place in auditor-client management negotiations 
occurs in unobservable settings and normally does not result in publicly available archival records")[we need a 
 
 







quality of the auditor’s work is difficult to measure or second-guess.  
The breadth and complexity of this issue is most evident when it is understood that 
almost any section of the financial statements, even if seemingly benign, entails intricate 
assessments and discretion, which, in turn, require auditor-client negotiations with outcomes 
not easily assessed from the outside.  Some elements of the financial report, such as 
contingent liabilities, which include pending liabilities that may result from litigation, clearly 
leave much room for considerable discretion on the part of the firm’s executives and 
auditors.156 What is less obvious is that this type of discretion is, by and large, applied with 
regard to almost all components of the financial report. For instance, the accounts receivable 
section presumably consists of the amounts owed to the firm by its customers and hence 
would seem relatively easy to measure objectively.  However, both accounting principles and 
the complicated nature of commerce render this presumption naive.  To begin with, there is 
the problem of doubtful debts. The corporation and, subsequently, its auditors must decide on 
the size of the deduction to be made for such items.  This determination involves many 
assumptions, assessments, and evaluations, and their reasonableness can be judged only by 
those intimately acquainted with the corporation’s business. The complexity of the accounts 
receivable section does not end here.  Some industries, including the pharmaceutical and 
computer hardware industries, are fraught with supply pressures from competitors that can 
substantially and quickly drive down prices due to innovations and the uncertain scope of 
patent protection.  This phenomenon causes distributors and retailers to order less than 
optimal levels of inventory so that they can fully enjoy future price cuts.  One frequent 
solution to this problem of suboptimal inventories and ordering is a commitment on the part 
page in the article from which this cite is taken from. I took it from a summary I have but you should check the 
paper itself. If you cannot find such exact cite so find something close and cite it instead]. 
156  See, e.g., CLYDE P. STICKNEY & ROMAN L. WEIL, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
CONCEPTS, METHODS, AND USESS 384-436 (10th ed. 2006) (discussing the concept of contingent liabilities). 
 
 






                                                          
of manufacturers to return to clients the amount of any price reduction in already-purchased 
inventory in the event that one occurs.  In instances of such a commitment, the manufacturer’s 
financial statements must include an allowance for the possibility and deduct it from accounts 
receivable (and the firm's profit).  This leaves companies with a wide scope of discretion to 
significantly alter the entire operations results, for any increase in this allowance will reduce 
the representation of the firm’s profits and any decrease will increase the figure.157  The 
reasonableness of the size of this allowance can be determined only with an understanding of 
the nature of the firm's business, anticipated future developments in the industry, and what 
reactions to these possible changes the firm is contemplating.  Upon completing its audit, the 
external auditor may then be equipped with the tools necessary to second-guess the decision 
made by the firm's executives; from the outside, however, it is virtually impossible to 
ascertain the fairness of the outcome of this non-transparent procedure.  Although it will 
eventually emerge as to whether the firm's assessments were correct, it will be extremely hard 
to blame the firm or auditor for their inability to make accurate determinations.  Believing in 
the verity of financial statements therefore requires much faith in the integrity of the auditor-
client negotiations.         
Unfortunately, however, these negotiations have ceased to be a level playing field. 
As discussed above, managers are increasingly compensated with stock options and the like, 
creating strong incentives to overplay firm performance and value, while auditors are 
"independent" at best, paid in a fixed amount. The old balance in negotiations between 
corporate insiders and auditors has thus tipped dramatically, with the one side of the equation 
becoming highly motivated to show improved results even if artificial.  The evidence 
157  For instance, at the world's largest pharmaceutical manufacturer of generic products, this allowance is 
almost 50% of the accounts receivable in the firm's balance sheet. See Note 5 of TEVA Pharmaceutical 











presented in the previous parts of this paper indicates that the outcome of this shift in balance 
caused a major disorder that threatened the integrity of the U.S. capital markets. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act responded to this tilting in the auditor-client balance of power with 
extensive and expensive measures, and it is still being debated as to whether they are 
beneficial and justified. Accordingly, the main purpose of this paper is to suggest a different 
measure for restoring this balance: calibrating auditor compensation to counter management’s 
undesirable incentives. 
The fact that auditors are paid in a fixed amount that is not linked in any direct way 
to their performance as gatekeepers is in itself an oddity.158 In the U.S. economy, pay-for-
performance is increasingly becoming the norm.  According to one study, the percentage of 
performance-pay jobs grew from 15% to 40% in the period between 1976 and 1998.159 
Consulting companies specializing in performance-pay compensation, such as Hay 
Associates, Hewitt, and Tower Perrin, have grown tremendously over the past thirty years, 
and SAP, a major supplier of software used to monitor worker performance, has multiplied its 
sales from DM150 million in 1985 to $8.8 billion in 2006.160 Pay-for-performance is even 
more pronounced within senior management, as already discussed,161 and similar 
arrangements appear in agreements between firms and service providers, including legal 
contingent fee arrangements and payment in stock and stock options to lawyers.162  It thus 
 
158  The formal argument that monitoring employees to enhance performance can achieve substantial gains 
can be traced back to the beginning of the twentieth century. See FREDERICK W. TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF 
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1911).  
159  See THOMAS LEMIEUX, W. BENTLEY MACLEOD & DANIEL PARENT, PERFORMANCE PAY AND WAGE 
INEQUALITY tbl. 2 (IZA Discussion Paper No. 2850 37 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=998266. 
Performance-pay jobs are defined in this study as "employment relationships in which part of the worker's total 
compensation includes a variable pay component," id. at 13. 
160  Id. at 7. 
161  See supra Part II.a.  
162  For a discussion on lawyer contingent fees see Peter Melamed, An Alternative to the Contingent Fee? 
An Assessment of the Incentive Effects of the English Conditional Fee Arrangement, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2433 
(2006).  For a discussion on lawyer compensation with stock and stock options see  Gwyneth E. McAlpine, 
 
 







seems important to explore the possibility of compensating the firm’s external auditor or 
audit partner using some form of variable pay aimed at fostering its performance as 
gatekeeper. 
 
a. The Mechanism of the Proposed Gatekeeper Compensation Plan 
The main mission of auditors is to ensure that a firm’s financial statements fairly 
represent its financial position.163  Instituting pay-for-performance would therefore entail that 
audit fees be contingent on the auditor’s success at preventing misreporting, fraud, and 
irregularities.164  Fraud and misreporting can support or lift share prices in the short-run but 
not for the long term.  Eventually, the manipulation or mistake is either openly flushed out or 
else simply loses its effect.  Thus, a drop in sales could be hidden for one or two quarters, but 
if the trend were to persist, it would ultimately surface; similarly, a shortage in the cash flow 
could be concealed for a certain time, but at some point creditors would discover this.165 In 
general, accounting maneuvers and manipulations can shift costs and income from one period 
to another, but this cannot be successfully achieved in the long-run.  
This makes using a stock-based mechanism in auditor compensation extremely 
tempting.  Exposing the auditor to a future drop in the firm’s share prices caused by 
Getting a Piece of the Action: Should Lawyers Be Allowed to Invest in Their Clients' Stock?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 
549 (1999).  
163  If fairness cannot be confirmed, the auditor must produce a qualified opinion or refrain from giving any 
opinion.  Qualified opinions in themselves are a strong signal to the market, as they reveal major problems in the 
issuer’s financial statements. See CHARLES J.P. CHEN, XIJIA SU & RONALD ZHAO, MARKET REACTION TO INITIAL 
QUALIFIED AUDIT OPINIONS IN AN EMERGING MARKET: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE (Oct. 
1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=192091 (discussing the ,market reaction to qualified opinions). 
Qualified opinions, however, are rare as corporate insiders prefer and are also required by law to correct faults 
that the auditor finds in the financials. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(i) ("Each 
financial report … shall reflect all material correcting adjustments that have been identified by a registered 
public accounting firm in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and the rules and 
regulations of the Commission.").  
164  The concept of contingent auditor fees, although currently banned by federal legislation, is not that 
anomalous.  In 1988, the FTC suggested lifting the ban on contingent fees as it was perceived to be 
anticompetitive in that it narrowed the set of contracts that could be formulated between auditors and their 
clients.  See Dye et al., supra note 25, at 1 (referencing the Wall Street Journal, Aug. 25, 1988). 
 
 







accounting maneuvers (either illegal or simply improper) would induce it to work harder 
against such actions. The auditor would increase its efforts even when no one outside the 
auditor-client relationship could accurately judge the quality of the financial statements.  The 
inevitable price drop would yield this result automatically without involving any assessment 
of the quality of the auditor’s work. This is an extremely important point, since reputation 
concerns, professional ethics, and, to some degree, also exposure to legal liability already 
ensure a certain level of adequate performance on the part of the auditor.  The benefit of 
stock-based performance is that it adds another layer to the auditor’s incentives, even when 
the auditor’s actions cannot be easily observed.  Put differently, the compensation mechanism 
will bind the auditor to its intended task even when monitoring is minimal. 
The idea, then, is to create an auditor-compensation mechanism that will be the 
reverse image of the existing structure of executive compensation and thereby create a 
countervailing force.166  As explained in the Introduction, there are few ways to produce the 
necessary impact, each of which has a different payout structure for the auditor.  In this paper, 
I suggest considering a mechanism that does not involve giving auditors put-options or 
making them short-sale the client stock,167 but, rather, is founded on three other central 
165  See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 1, at 204 ("managers were systematically able to overestimate revenues 
and then recognize them prematurely in ways that ultimately compelled earnings restatements…"). 
166  As we shall see below, the framework suggested in the text must be accompanied by a safe-harbor rule 
set by the Securities and Exchange Commission. See infra Part IV.b.  The specific details of the arrangement 
adopted by each firm should be tailored to the firm’s needs as determined by its audit committee and the 
compensation consultants it could hire.  This procedure should be analogous to the process for setting executive 
compensation that is conducted by the compensation committee.  Compensation committees often hire 
consultant firms such as Frederick Cook or Towers Perrin.  See, e.g., MARTIN J. CONYON, COMPENSATION 
CONSULTANTS AND EXECUTIVE PAY: EVIDENCE FROM THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM (May 
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1106729 (discussing the role of executive compensation 
consultants). 
167  Since call-options are the most common executive stock-based compensation, offering auditors put–
options seems the obvious option for creating an exact mirror image. Indeed, put-options would make the 
auditor benefit from revealing price-reducing information. While I do not necessarily object to this particular 
mechanism, I prefer to use the mechanism outlined in the text as the starting point of this discussion. Given that 
this proposal should map out the path to be taken by the SEC and survive public debate, I believe it is best to put 
forth the least controversial proposal.  Specifically, I do not want auditors who use this plan to be considered 
speculators, a title that sometimes attaches to traders who use price-perfecting mechanisms such as short-sales 
and put-options.   
 
 






                                                          
elements: 1) deferred compensation that would channel a significant proportion of auditor 
compensation to this mechanism; 2) rotation of the audit partner, as currently required by law, 
or, better yet, rotation of the audit firm; and 3) conversion of the deferred compensation into 
shares of the corporate client following rotation and subject to a holding period that would 
expose the auditor to the risk of future price drops.  The first element of the scheme ties up a 
large proportion of the auditor’s compensation in deferred compensation (secured in the 
hands of a trustee).  This is necessary to provide the auditor with enough incentive to fight 
fraud.  The precise proportion should be left to the parties to decide (a point to which I shall 
return), but it is important to keep in mind that, currently, over 50% of executive 
compensation is composed of stock and stock-based mechanisms.168 As was shown, this 
compensation structure has made executives quite zealous with regard to the firm’s value and, 
at times, over-aggressive in their disclosure practices.  Therefore, an effective counter-scheme 
would necessitate devoting a large fraction, perhaps even the lion's share, of the audit fees to 
stock-based compensation.   
Note that stock-based compensation involves risk (the fundamental risk of 
fluctuation in share prices) and, therefore, entails a cost.  For instance, the literature has 
speculated that employees who receive options as compensation value each dollar’s worth of 
option (in market terms) at less than 50 cents and are therefore willing to receive much less in 
salary than they actually receive in stock options.169 This means that stock-based 
168  See supra Part II.a. 
169  Employees are typically risk-averse. The value of stock-based compensation – which is a major 
component of employees' remuneration—is highly contingent on risk factors and uncertainties that are far 
beyond the control of the recipient employees. Risk-averse employees therefore discount the value of stock-
based compensation. Firms could substitute this type of compensation with a much lower payment in cash that 
does not entail uncertainty. The difference between the two alternatives is the cost, or the waste, involved in 
stock-based compensation. Several leading economists have tried to quantify this cost, concluding that, 
operating under reasonable assumptions about risk aversion and diversification, employees value options (with 
ordinary features) at “only about half of their cost to the firm.” Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble 
with Stock Options, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 56 (2003); see also Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Optimal 
Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 209, 211 (2000); Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. 
 
 







remuneration is more expensive to the firm than flat fees; the same is applicable with regard 
to the mechanism proposed in this paper. This notwithstanding, however, the executive 
population seems to be generally more vulnerable to this particular risk than the typical 
auditor or accounting firm. First, the executive is an individual whereas the audit firm is a 
deep-pocket entity, making it much less risk-averse. Second, even if the audit partner as an 
individual were to be subject to a stock-based compensation mechanism, she could diversify 
her portfolio by accepting this type of compensation from several clients.170  Unlike the 
executive, therefore, all her eggs would not be placed in one basket.  This diversification 
advantage is magnified at the accounting firm level.171  And note that diversification does not 
undermine the incentives generated by the scheme to counter inflated share prices.  The fact 
that a person repeatedly plays the lottery does not mean that she would be willing to accept 
deficient lottery tickets that do not meet their promised returns.  Finally, the auditor 
compensation scheme suggested here requires shorter holding periods, as will be discussed 
below, than those commonly used in executive compensation schemes, thus exposing auditors 
to less fundamental risk than that borne by executives.172 
Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 12-13 (2002). Another study 
estimated that, for every dollar worth of options, companies actually waste $0.64 to cover the risk premium for 
employees. PAUL OYER & SCOTT SCHAEFER, WHY DO SOME FIRMS GIVE STOCK OPTIONS TO ALL EMPLOYEES? 
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF ALTERNATIVE THEORIES 16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 10222, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10222. Employee risk-aversion is also evidenced 
by the fact that they tend to exercise their options before the expiration date. See J. CARR BETTIS ET AL., THE 
COST OF EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS 3 (Mar. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=376440 (finding that employees exercise options nearly five years prior to 
expiration and that employees in high-volatility firms exercise their options more than a year and a half earlier 
compared to employees in low-volatility firms). 
170  This can take away most of the risk except for that of market wide fluctuations, known as the 
systematic risk of the market. For a discussion on market (systematic) risk and diversification, see RICHARD A. 
BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, CORPORATE FINANCE 154-72 (8th ed. 2006). 
171  Diversification cannot solve the risk of the entire market fluctuations (so called systematic risk).  This 
risk could be partially solved however by indexing the proposed auditor stock based compensation to some 
market measure such as the average return of the other firms in the same industry.  For a similar 
recommendation to index executive stock options see BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 12, at 159-89. 
172  The literature also shows that executives often receive equity-based compensation in addition to the 
cash amount of their previous salaries, and the switch between the two means of compensation has not been 
swift.  This may be the result of the cash constraints of executives or the result of expropriation by executives. 
One way or another, this phenomenon makes equity-based compensation even more costly for shareholders. See 
 
 







The second element of the proposed program is auditor rotation, either at the 
individual level of the audit partner or the entire auditing firm.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
made auditor rotation mandatory, requiring, as mentioned, that audit partners in charge of a 
client's file not handle the same client for more than five years in a row.173 Section 207 of the 
Act also expressed an approach favoring audit firm rotation, in requiring the U.S. Comptroller 
General to "conduct a study and review of the potential effects of requiring the mandatory 
rotation of registered public accounting firms."174 Unlike audit partner rotation, however, the 
harsher audit firm rotation requirement has never been made mandatory; 175 perhaps this will 
have to wait for the next corporate crisis.176   
A simple rationale for requiring audit rotation was presented in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act itself, as well as in the relevant literature: without rotation, the auditor may develop a 
relationship with the firm and its executives that may compromise its ability to conduct the 
audit and scrutinize the financials.  Indeed, a new auditor ensures a fresh pair of eyes, 
whereas a long-time auditor might eventually fall asleep at the gate, especially if there have 
been no warning signs indicating that something is amiss for a number of years.177  Some 
Sharon Hannes, Reverse Monitoring: On the Hidden Role of Employee Stock-Based Compensation, 105 MICH. 
L. REV. 1421, 1439-40 (2007). This problem does not attach to the mechanism of auditor remuneration proposed 
in this paper.  
173  15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(j) (2006) (SOX § 203); see also supra note 28.  
174  15 U.S.C.A. § 7232 (2006) (SOX § 207). Mandatory audit firm rotation exists in some non-U.S. 
jurisdictions, including Austria, Italy, Brazil, and, partially, Singapore and was previously the norm in Spain and 
Canada. See GAO U.S. Gen. Acct. Office, Public Accounting Firms: Required Study on the Potential Effects of 
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation, Rep. No. GAO-04-216, at 48 (November 2003), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04216.pdf [hereinafter GAO, Potential Effects of Mandatory Audit Firm 
Rotation].  
175  In compliance with section 207 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the U.S. General Accounting Office 
conducted an extensive survey of mandatory audit firm rotation and concluded that "the costs of mandatory 
audit firm rotation are likely to exceed the benefits and suggested postponing the decision on mandatory 
rotation. See, id. at 5. 
176  One of the explanations given by the GAO for not making audit firm rotation mandatory was that it was 
necessary to first wait and assess the full impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms, since these reforms could be 
sufficient and serve as a proper alternative to audit-firm rotation. Id. at 43. It is my guess that insufficiency could 
be proven, if at all, only after crisis occurs.   
177  The upside of long auditor tenure is the learning effect of prolonged audit services and the enhanced 
incentives to develop firm specific audit capabilities.  In practice, provisions calling for mandatory audit rotation 
have been debated intensively even before the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, but most of the available empirical 
 
 







regard the abovementioned advantages to audit rotation as in themselves capable of 
overcoming the benefits of protracted audit tenure (mostly useful learning on the part of the 
auditor and its increased willingness to make client-specific investments).178  These, however, 
are not the points that make rotation crucial to the suggested mechanism, at least not directly.  
Rather, the importance of rotation in the proposed plan derives from the fact that the scheme 
requires that the auditor be allowed to divest its stock-based compensation only after it has 
ceased to provide services to the firm.  This would cause the auditor to flush out problems 
immediately, while still in the firm’s service, so as to prevent the possibility of a price drop in 
the value of its compensation after it is no longer auditing the company and can no longer 
conceal financial problems. Since audit partner rotation was recently made a requirement 
under law, an audit partner compensation plan can be designed in line with this paper’s 
proposed model without needing to change the existing audit partner tenure.  However, the 
mechanism presented here would be best applied as an ambitious overall scheme covering the 
remuneration of the audit firm in its entirety, which would then require audit firm rotation. 
The main reason that the latter plan is preferable is that loyalty between partners in the same 
accounting firm could operate against the incentives created by the plan to uncover fraud and 
misreporting.  In addition, it is harder to monitor the incentive scheme of the individual audit 
partner within her audit firm than the audit fee paid to the firm.  Finally, the audit firm is a 
evidence is not conclusive. See, e.g., Richard J. Fairchild, Auditor Tenure, Managerial Fraud, and Report 
Qualification: A Game-Theoretic Approach, 5 ICFAI J. AUDIT PRACTICE 42-54 (2008) (considering the effect of 
auditor tenure on auditor performance and discussing two competing effects—the "learning curve effect" and the 
"loss of independence effect”).  One would expect that the beneficial learning effects would be especially strong 
in the first few years of the tenure while the harmful effects of prolonged tenure would become especially strong 
down the road.  Indeed, at least one study found that auditor performance is weaker in the beginning of its tenure 
but also in cases of extended auditor-client relationships. See MARK SCHELKER, AUDITORS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE PUBLIC SECTOR (Mar. 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=959392 
(empirically testing auditor performance in mandated auditor rotation cases in the public sector and suggesting 
that mandatory audit rotation is advisable for public firms as well).  
178  See U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs and the House Committee on Financial Services, Required Study on the Potential Effects of Mandatory 
Audit Firm Rotation 13-14, 33-48, GAO-04-216, Nov. 2003 (minority views of institutional investors that 
supported audit firm rotation). 
 
 






                                                          
much better risk-bearer than the audit partner, due to its greater wealth and diversification 
ability.  Nevertheless, since audit firms hate to lose clients,179 arguably the principal reason 
that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not mandate audit firm rotation,180 it is quite plausible that 
the scheme proposed here would have to be tailored to apply to the audit partner and not the 
audit firm. 
Before continuing to the third and crucial element of the suggested auditor-
compensation plan, it might be helpful to recall the example from the Introduction of a plan 
that allows for a maximum tenure of three years, during which time the audit firm (or audit 
partner) defers a certain fraction of its compensation until it signs and certifies the last 
auditing report.181  At such point in time, the auditor (or the relevant partner) would receive 
shares in the firm of a value equivalent to the amount of deferred compensation based on the 
market value of those shares at the time of issuance.  Thus, if the price per share on the day 
after the release of the last audited report by the issuer is $30 and the deferred compensation 
is $30 million, then the auditor (or the partner) would receive one million shares. Those 
shares would then be restricted and could be sold only after a specified holding period. 
This example illustrates the third element of the proposed plan, namely, the 
conversion of the deferred compensation into restricted shares in the corporate client 
179  Some of the current audit-client relationships are amazingly long, and both parties involved are quite 
proud of this connection. See, e.g., 2001 General Motors Proxy Statement, Form DEF 14A, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40730/000089016301000190/0000890163-01-000190-0001.txt  
(Deloitte & Touche LLP has audited the Corporation's books annually since 1918.").  Note that a widespread 
usage of the advocated scheme would mean that many more clients would be up for grabs.  Hence, the fear of 
losing clients as a result of the proposed scheme is not truly warranted.  
180  The common explicit reasons for the resistance to audit firm rotation are that "the additional financial 
costs and the loss of organizational knowledge associated with audit firm rotation, as well as the current reforms 
being implemented, may negate any benefits of rotating auditors."  PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS: REQUIRED 
STUDY ON THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF MANDATORY AUDIT FIRM ROTATION (2003), available at 
http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/summary_0199-35292_ITM. 
181  A three-year term of service for an audit firm is not extremely unique even today, in the absence of the 
proposed mechanism.  In a survey of a large sample of 4720 U.S. public firms, the audit firms of 680 of the 
firms had provided services three years or less, Gul, Jaggi & Krishan, supra note 142 at 31 tbl. 2. The median 










                                                          
following auditor rotation.  Conversion following rotation and the holding period 
requirement place the auditor in a long position for a substantial period of time, thus creating 
incentive for the auditor to reveal any information that artificially inflates share value before 
conversion and to do all it can to prevent postponement of bad news until the period 
following conversion.  This effect would be magnified by compensating the succeeding 
auditor under a similar scheme, who would therefore be similarly highly motivated to reveal 
any problematic matter left behind by the previous auditor.  A holding period is, of course, 
vital, since it means that the auditor bears a risk that bad information that it did not force the 
firm to reveal will slip out and harm its compensation.   
The down-side of the holding period is that it exposes the auditor to the risk of 
fluctuations in firm value that are unrelated to misreporting. Under the proposed 
compensation scheme, prior to the holding period and throughout the auditor’s term providing 
services to the company, the auditor does not shoulder the risk of market fluctuations in the 
firm’s value.  Because the auditor receives its deferred compensation in shares based on their 
market price following termination of its service to the corporation, previous stock price 
variations do not affect the value of the auditor compensation package in its entirety ($30 
million in the above example). The number of shares the auditor receives will be set with this 
goal in mind, and it will thus receive fewer shares if the price per share increases and vice 
versa if the price per share drops.  This means that the auditor bears no investment risk during 
the period it works for the firm,182 but must still be alert to any misreporting that could 
182  The exception to this is scenarios in which the firm collapses and the value of the shares drop to 
practically zero.  In such an endgame scenario, the incentive plan set forth in this paper might seem to backfire 
since the auditor would loose all its compensation if he reveals the status of the firm.  It is therefore suggested 
that the amount of differed compensation be held by a trustee who would normally use the accrued amount to 
purchase shares from the corporation for the benefit of the auditor at the end of the audit term. However, if the 
corporation experiences bankruptcy, delisting from the stock exchange, deregistration by the SEC or other major 
failures so designated in the trust agreement, then the trustee would release the deferred compensation to the 
audit firm, preventing the perverse incentive of the endgame scenario mentioned above.  Another benefit of 
 
 







artificially inflate the value of the shares and could then backfire when it can sell its shares. 
Only after the termination of the auditor’s services to the firm and during the holding 
period does it become subject to the risk of fluctuation in firm value and to the market risk in 
general. It is important to note, however, that the holding period under the proposed scheme 
could be shorter than the typical period during which employees are required to hold on to 
equity-based remuneration, since the latter is intended for the purpose of encouraging a 
prolonged effort from the employees so as to improve firm value as well as constituting an 
employee retention mechanism.183 The holding period in our case is merely required to ensure 
that information concealed during the period that the auditor worked for the firm is given 
enough time to leak out. Moreover, a shorter holding period leads to less risk-exposure and, 
consequently, makes the scheme less expensive (relative to employee stock-based 
compensation) for the corporation and, indirectly, its shareholders, who would eventually 
have to pay the auditor for its risk-bearing.  Another important component of the proposed 
compensation scheme is intended to contend with Enron-like scenarios.  Sometimes the 
disclosure of a corporation's actual status could lead to its immediate bankruptcy, which, in 
turn, would eliminate the value of the auditor's incentive pay package.  In order to overcome 
auditors’ incentives to conceal such devastating Information the trustee holding the auditor's 
deferred compensation should be instructed to release the deferred compensation in cash to 
the auditor in the event of such a disastrous outcome. 
Finally, it is true that the proposed arrangement produces not only beneficial 
incentives for the auditor to fight against artificial inflation of share prices but also a 
using a trustee is the ability to issue the shares during the holding period to the trustee who will make sure that 
they are not sold by the audit firm until the end of the restricted period.   
183  A commonly-repeated argument in the literature is that options are “golden handcuffs,” in that they 
help firms preserve their workforce and prevent attrition. Options undoubtedly do have this quality, as they 
usually vest gradually, normally along a four-year period, which makes it worthwhile for workers to maintain 
their positions at the firm. See Hannes, supra note 172, at 1429.  
 
 






                                                          
detrimental incentive to artificially deflate share prices. The auditor, however, does not work 
in a vacuum.  Rather, it negotiates and scrutinizes reports that are prepared by corporate 
executives motivated by equity-based compensation.184  Two sophisticated parties who are 
acquainted with the true state of the corporation and the appropriate accounting treatment 
now have opposing interests.  The managers might derive benefit from artificially inflated 
stock prices while the auditor would benefit from just the opposite.  This appears to be a level 
playing field, unlike the current imbalance with interested executives on one side and 
independent auditors on the other.  It must also be recalled that auditors do not sit behind the 
driver’s wheel of the company.  They are involved only in the disclosure process. Securities 
law prohibits directors and officers from short sales of the company's securities,185 a 
restriction that stems from the fear of corporate executives being incentivized to harm the 
value of the firm they run.  Auditors, however, do not run the company, and thus, their 
incentive to block disclosure of information that will artificially inflate firm value does not 
have similar consequences. 
The proposed compensation scheme raises additional issues that must be considered.  
For one, this paper assumes that corporations themselves may not have sufficient incentive to 
opt for such a plan.  For this reason, the paper turns to institutional investors and major 
creditors to pressure firms into adopting this auditor compensation structure.  It is also 
important to address the problematic possibility of collusion between the corporation and the 
auditor, which would undermine the goals of the scheme, and to compare the proposed reform 
with reforms raised by others.  However, prior to any discussion of these matters and others, it 
184  For the discussion on equity-based compensation, see supra Part II.a. For the discussion of audit-client 
negotiations, see supra Part IV. See also Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 53 (2003). 
185  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (2000) ("It shall be unlawful for any such 
beneficial owner, director, or officer, directly or indirectly, to sell any equity security of such issuer (other than 
an exempted security), if the person selling the security or his principal: (1) does not own the security sold … 











                                                          
is necessary to consider the safe harbor rule this paper suggests introducing into the 
securities regulation in the context of auditor compensation.  For in the current absence of 
such a safe harbor, the proposed plan is simply illegal, and any attempt to adopt it would be 
futile. 
 
b. The Need for a Safe Harbor Rule 
Current securities law quite clearly bars the possibility of adopting an auditor 
compensation regime of the type suggested by this paper.  Since the intention of the proposed 
scheme is to enhance the auditor’s performance as gatekeeper, its preclusion in fact 
undermines the purpose of the securities legislation.  Most ironic is the fact that it is the 
auditor independence requirement that prevents the adoption of the proposed compensation 
structure.186  Yet since the scheme detaches auditor incentives from management incentives, 
it should logically not be excluded by independence guidelines.187
The auditor independence regulation sets forth a general standard of auditor 
independence and then specifies a variety of applications of the general standard to particular 
circumstances, without purporting to cover all possible circumstances that raise autonomy 
concerns.188  In any event, both the general standard and, even more so, the specific 
applications work against the compensation plan proposed here.  The general standard states 
that the Securities Exchange Commission will not recognize an accountant as maintaining 
independence if it "would conclude that the accountant is not capable of exercising objective 
and impartial judgment on all issues encompassed within the accountant's engagement … 
  Regulation S-X, Rule 2-01(c), 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01(c) (2006) ("This paragraph sets forth a non-exclusive 
specification of circumstances inconsistent with paragraph (b) of this section."). 
186  Regulation S-X, Rule 2-01, 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01 (2006). 
187  The purpose of the independence regulation is outlined in the Preliminary Note to Regulation S-X, Rule 
2-01, 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01 (2006) ("Rule 2-01 is designed to ensure that the auditors are qualified and 










equirement, or alternatively because 
the audit
ions set by the independence 
requirem
."189 Objectivity can be impaired either because the auditor and client share a mutual interest, 
which is the concern at the heart of the independence r
or and audit client have conflicting interests.190 
Deferring a portion of the auditor’s compensation and a commitment to purchase 
restricted shares in the audited client corporation could be interpreted as violating the 
objectivity requirement.  Note, however, that the proposed remuneration scheme creates a 
conflict primarily between the audit client management and the auditor.  Moreover, the 
conflict that arises is a constructive one in that it counterbalances the incentives produced by 
the typical executive compensation schemes.  Indeed, this conflict is the crux of this paper 
and its scheme. But there is little point in haggling over the appropriate interpretation of the 
general standard, for as we will see shortly, the specific prohibit
ent prevent the adoption of the advocated arrangement. 
At least three of the specific conditions for auditor independence set by the rule seem 
to be violated by our auditor payment scheme.  First, the rule states that auditor independence 
is prejudiced when there is "any loan to or from an audit client."191  Thus, under this 
provision, the deferred pay component of the scheme could undermine auditor independence, 
as it is arguably a loan to the audit client.  The rationale behind precluding such loans is that 
they generate an auditor interest in the client’s financial stability.  Given the fact that the 
deferred compensation in our case is held by a trustee, the financial stability of the client is 
not an important concern from this paper's vantage point.  Second, the rule provides that any 
investment, including in "stock, bonds, notes, options, or other securities," in the audit client 
                                                          
189  Regulation S-X, Rule 2-01(b), 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01(b) (2006). 
190  Preliminary note to Regulation S-X, Rule 2-01, 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01 (2006) ("In considering this 
on of a service []."). 
 
standard, the Commission looks in the first instance to whether a relationship or the provisi
191  Regulation S-X, Rule 2-01(c)(1)(ii)(A), 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01(c)(1)(ii)(A) (2006).
 
 






s relating to the client, this prohibition also blocks the 
advocate
constitutes a violation of auditor independence.192  Although the proposed compensation 
plan allows the auditor to hold shares of the audit client only once it has ceased to provide 
audit services, the prohibition in the regulation is formulated broadly enough to encompass 
also a commitment to purchase shares in the audit client.193 Finally, the auditor independence 
rule bars payment of contingent fees.194  Since the proposed compensation scheme ties the 
actual auditor fee to future contingencie
d compensation arrangement. 
The inevitable conclusion from the above is that the proposed gatekeeper 
compensation plan requires that the SEC promulgate a safe harbor rule applicable in this 
context.195  A safe harbor rule sets forth conditions under which the Commission will 
presume that the law has been complied with.196 Tailoring the auditor compensation plan to 
accord with the terms of a safe harbor rule would ensure immunity from SEC prosecution for 
any deviation from the auditor independence requirement.  In accordance with the principles 
of the proposed scheme noted in Section a, the safe harbor rule should specify the features of 
the plan that would be guaranteed SEC clearance.  The particular details of each 
compensation arrangement, as well as the very decision as to whether to adopt it, should be 
left to the private parties involved. The safe harbor could also serve to ensure against issuers’ 
                                                          
192  Regulation S-X, Rule 2-01(c)(1)(i)(A), 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01(c)(1)(i)(A) (2006). 
193
AZAN
230.147, 230.175, 230.506.  
  Regulation S-X, Rule 2-01(c)(1), 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01(c)(1) (2006) ("An accountant is not independent 
if, at any point during the audit and professional engagement period, the accountant has a direct financial interest 
in the accountant's audit client … ."). 
194  Regulation S-X, Rule 2-01(c)(5), 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01(c)(5) (2006) ("An accountant is not independent 
if, at any point during the audit and professional engagement period, the accountant provides any service or 
product to an audit client for a contingent fee or commission, or receives a contingent fee or commission from 
an audit client.").  
195  For a general discussion of safe harbor rules, see H , supra note 125 at 47. 
196  Safe harbor examples include Rule 144 (exemption for secondary transactions), Rule 147 (exemption 
for interstate offerings), Rule 175 (forward looking statements), Reg. D. - Rules 501-508 (exemptions for 
offerings by an issuer not involving a public offering), Rule 10b-18 (stating that the announcement of a firm's 
intention to repurchase shares serves as a safe harbor against Rule 10b-5 allegations); and a most recent safe 
harbor created in Rule 14d-10(d)(2) (stating that approval of independent directors for compensation 
arrangements exempts such arrangements from the best-price rule in tender offers). See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144, 
 
 






n to the client firm's shares throughout the holding period.197  It is also 
im rtant to make sure that managers do not time their equity grants to circumvent the 
pu
 
certain advantages to the plan that will not materialize until the scheme is widely applied.  
using the compensation scheme as a smoke-screen, when they actually have no intention of 
providing their auditors with powerful incentives to counter fraud and misreporting.  For 
instance, the safe harbor should forbid auditors from hedging their exposure to the risk 
involved in holding o
po
rpose of the proposed scheme.198 
c. Further Discussion of the Proposed Scheme 
The purpose of this subsection is to discuss the proper ways of encouraging the 
adoption of the compensation plan advocated in this paper, to advise the relevant board 
committees on how to avoid certain shortcomings of the plan, and to explain the advantages 
of the plan as compared to a high profile alternative reform proposal.  While the main purpose 
of the safe harbor rule called for above is to legitimize and enable the proposed compensation 
plan and ensure integrity in its use, regulators should also consider granting firms that do 
choose to adopt it certain exemptions from the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation.  There may be at 
least three reasons to give serious consideration to this option.  First, as discussed above, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act entails considerable costs, in particular, its disputed section 404 with its 
extensive and expensive requirement for assessment of internal controls.199  If improved 
auditor incentives, such as those generated by the proposed compensation scheme, can serve 
as a cheaper alternative to any of these measures, then it would be worthwhile to consider 
relinquishing some of the more expensive mechanisms. Second, exemptions can serve as an 
incentive for firms to adopt the scheme before it becomes a prevalent practice.  There are 
                                                          
197  And for instance, the rule must require that the auditor not short-sell any shares of the client during the 
lding period.  ho
198  The analysis in section c below elaborates and accounts for this possibility.   
 
 






he arrangement more attractive to issuers, at least 
until it b
ization and Innovation in Corporate 
tract ics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1999) (discussing the effect of network 
Once many audit clients have adopted the model, auditors could diversify away much of the 
risk it imposes by taking on a number of different clients with similar plans.  Furthermore, 
once many firms are using this type of plan in the version that includes audit-firm rotation, 
audit firms will feel less apprehensive about losing a client that offers such a compensation 
plan, as many other firms using similar schemes with other audit firms will eventually be up 
for grabs as clients upon culmination of the tenure periods.  In addition, the literature on 
network externalities shows that issuers are generally wary of adopting novel legal 
arrangements until they become widespread.200  Finally, as explained above,201 since existing 
shareholders can sometimes benefit from inflated share prices at the expense of future 
shareholders and creditors, they have sub-optimal incentives to adopt a compensation plan 
that improves the accuracy of share prices.  These low incentives should be counterbalanced 
by offering exemptions from expensive regulation.202 Accordingly, for these various reasons, 
regulators may see fit to add to the proposed safe harbor rule certain exemptions from other 
SEC rules, which would make adopting t
ecomes prevalent amongst firms. 
Aside from these possible inducements from the regulator, market forces could also 
work to support the adoption of the proposed plan.  To begin with, institutional shareholders 
and banks hold large stakes of equity and debt and are therefore vulnerable to misreporting 
 
199  See infra Part III.b. 
200  See Michael Klauner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 
(1995) (suggesting that legal products may be network products that provide much of their benefits only when 
they are widespread); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standard
Con ing (or "the Econom
externalities on innovation and optimization of corporate contracts). See also Sharon Hannes, Corporate 
Stagnation: Discussion and Reform Proposal, 30 J. CORP. L. 51 (2005). 
201  See infra Part II.c. 
202  Recall also the managerial power theory that argues that managers control the mechanisms that set their 
pay and thus avoid optimal incentives to improve performance. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 12, at 159-
89. This power can spill over to the mechanisms that set auditor pay as well. 
 
 






hen their adoption is accompanied by the adoption of the mechanism proposed in 
this pape
’s particular characteristics features 
(includin
and inaccurate share prices.203  The proposed gatekeepers' compensation plan could 
ameliorate the problem. These powerful market players should, therefore, use their sway to 
back adoption of the advocated plan.204  The same is true for third-party proxy advisors, such 
as the Institutional Shareholders Services.  Since good corporate governance is a priority on 
these advisors' agenda, they can use their leverage to advocate the proposed plan.  One way 
they could do so would be by showing greater leniency towards certain managerial sponsored 
proposals w
r. 
Internal corporate bodies, particularly, board of directors audit committees, will also 
play a crucial role in the decision whether to adopt the proposed plan.  The independent 
directors on such committees must understand that, as outsiders, they have limited insight into 
the intricacies of the auditor-client negotiations.  Therefore, their oversight role should 
concentrate on creating the right incentives for the auditor in its relationship with the 
corporation and its financial officers.  In my view, the proposed plan can be used to calibrate 
such incentives, and each audit committee should decide whether the plan is suited to its 
corporation and, accordingly, adjust the plan to the firm
g the compensation structure of its executives). 
Moreover, the audit committee, together with the compensation committee, will have 
an important role to play in overcoming certain perils involved in the proposed plan.  It is 
                                                          
203  Despite corporate scholars’ almost exclusive focus on shareholders and institutional investors, recent 
studies have shown that banks play a monitoring role that improves corporate governance.  See,e.g., JOANNA 
SHEPHERD, FREDERICK TUNG & ALBERT YOON, CROSS-MONITORING AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=914229 (finding evidence that banks serve a monitoring role that improves 
firm value); ELIF SISLI, MONITORING BY AFFILIATED BANKERS ON BOARD OF DIRECTORS: EVIDENCE FROM 
CORPORATE FINANCING OUTCOMES (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=973973 (showing that banker-
directors whose banks have outstanding loans perform an important monitoring role on the company's board of 
directors). 
204  There is evidence that corporate fraud occurs often in forms with much leverage, indicating that banks 
and other creditors are the frequent victims of disclosure manipulation.  See, e.g., Patricia M. Dechow et al., 
 
 






s in the interim 
period b
 financial incentives for auditors, it is no wonder, as the empirical literature 
reveals, 
 
Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by 
EC
especially important to ensure that the timing of managerial stock-option grants and their 
realization does not undermine the auditor compensation plan.  For instance, if managers 
receive the stock-option grant soon after the firm’s current auditor (compensated as advocated 
in this paper) issues its final audit report and exercise the options before the next auditor 
issues its final audit report, then they could get away with inflating share price
etween the two reports.  This, of course, runs counter to the motivation behind the 
proposed gatekeeper compensation plan and should be prevented.   
The audit committee would have yet another important function in blocking the 
possibility of auditors trying to build a reputation of not working harder despite receiving 
equity-based compensation.  For if auditors were to be hired directly by the firm’s managers 
(who may fancy auditors with such reputation) such a scenario would pose a significant threat 
to the objectives underlying the arrangement set forth in this paper.  It is also important to 
understand that the advocated compensation scheme does not overcome the problem of  
severe and rare instances of auditor corruption.  A corrupt auditor could simply accept a side 
payment that would eliminate any favorable incentive generated by the compensation plan.  
Most auditors, however, are far from corrupt and would never accept such a side payment or 
knowingly play along with dishonest managers.  Nonetheless, the underlying rationale of the 
proposed plan rests on the notion that even honest auditors are human beings and their 
incentives should be calibrated to support the goal we want them to achieve.205  In the 
absence of proper
that they often fail as gatekeepers and cave in to manager pressure to accept distorted 
the S , 13 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1, 21 (1996). 
205  As discussed earlier, in supra Part IV.b, this type of incentive-based compensation is currently 
prohibited by law.  One could wonder why such compensation for auditors did not evolve prior to the imposition 
of this prohibitive regulation.  I do not believe, however, that this is a fair question.  Incentive-based 
compensation, which is currently the norm in many branches of the economy, is a relatively new phenomenon. 
 
 






I will not delve into these significant differences and will only flesh out the 
unique a
See LEMIEUX, MACLEOD & PARENT, supra note 159.  The inability to adopt incentive-based compensation is, 
therefore, relevant only nowadays when such an arrangement is prevalent throughout the economy. 
financial reports. 
Before concluding the discussion, it seems imperative to compare the advantages of 
this paper's reform proposal with alternative reform proposals aimed at improving auditors' 
gatekeeper role.  Chief among the latter is the proposal to enhance auditor exposure to legal 
liability.206  Simply put, the Supreme Court’s current interpretation of the securities 
regulation leaves hardly any opening for public shareholders to sue auditors for failing in their 
duties.207  Accordingly, it has been suggested that either the judicial interpretation or the 
securities regulation itself be amended to the end of increasing auditors' potential liability.208  
Liability and incentive compensation are two mechanisms that, under certain circumstances, 
can achieve similar results, albeit by way of different apparatuses and at different costs.  For 
brevity’s sake, 
dvantages of the compensation plan proposed here that are not shared by alternative 
mechanisms.   
As noted earlier, those cases of fraud and financial restatements that have been 
exposed constitute only the tip of the iceberg of the phenomenon of inaccurate or improper 
 
206  Other relevant reforms that I do not discuss here are those aimed at minimizing the adverse side-effects 
of management equity compensation.  See Jesse M. Fried, Hands-Off Options, VANDERBILT L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1091068 (suggesting a new design for option grants 
that overcome the  manipulation incentive as well as managers’ ability to abuse inside information). The most 
obvious downside to this type of reform, which my proposal does not suffer from, is the impairment to the 
compensation committee’s discretion and flexibility in setting executive pay. 
207  See, e.g., Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) 
(restating previous rulings that private plaintiffs cannot sue third parties for aiding and abetting corporate so-
called 10b-5 securities disclosure violations). See also Adam  C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC 
v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.: The Political Economy of Securities Class Action Reform, CATO SUPREME COURT 
REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1159983 (describing the current legal state and 
arguing that courts, Congress, and the SEC are powerless to change the situation); BARBARA BLACK, 
STONERIDGE INVESTMENT PARTNERS V. SCIENTIFIC-ATLANTA (8TH CIR. 2006): WHAT MAKES IT THE MOST 
IMPORTANT SECURITIES CASE IN A DECADE? (Univ. Cincinnati Public Law Research Paper No. 07-21, 2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020102.  
208  See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 44, at 309 ("A more relevant public policy should also: (1) increase the 
legal threat to deter acquiescence in managerial fraud; … .").  For an international comparison of the current 
trends in auditor liability claims, see Jagdish Pathak, Liability of Auditors: A Growing Concern, 4 ICFAI J. AUDIT 
PRACTICE 7 (2007). 
 
 






ntly, the same 
reasonin
financial disclosure.  Often fraud and accounting mistakes are unobservable and particularly 
difficult to prove in the courtroom.  Business and financial climates change quickly, and 
economy-wide or business-specific downturns can wash away the traces of imprecise 
disclosures involving fraud.  In other instances, accounting sugar-coating and whitewashing 
fall within the scope of legitimate accounting discretion and therefore never generate legal 
liability even when the legal standard is more favorable to plaintiffs.  The cost to the economy 
of the consequent inflated and inaccurate share prices is enormous.209  The unique benefits 
of the incentive compensation scheme are most pronounced where other mechanisms, 
including legal liability and reputation, fail. For even behind the closed doors of the auditor-
client negotiations, where both sides possess private information that can never be verified in 
court, the auditor will have incentive to avoid inflated earnings, which would in the long run 
reduce the corporation's cash flows and impact future share prices.  turning turn, even if no 
indications of fraud or accounting error can be proven, share prices would drop, and the 
auditor would share the losses borne by future shareholders.  Put differe
g that justifies equity-based compensation for corporate executives justifies also 
equity-based compensation (of the type suggested in this paper) for auditors.  Both 
arrangements generate performance incentives even when no one is watching. 
Finally, I wish to address two concerns that the proposed scheme gives rise to.  First, 
under the plan, equity compensation is provided to the auditor based on the market price of 
the firm’s shares following the auditor’s certification of the final financial statement.  Thus, 
for a number of years (three in the above example), share prices do not directly affect the 
auditor incentives.  Does this mean, however, that the plan creates no incentives for the 
auditor until the auditor starts working on the final audit? If this is, indeed, the case, then we 
should not anticipate any improvement in the accuracy of disclosure and share prices until the 
 
 









auditor failed to expose.  Otherwise, the new auditor would have to bear the risk of the firm’s 
share prices being adversely affected during the holding period of its own compensation 
scheme.210  With this in mind, the first auditor will also be induced to fend against all 
 
209  See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 13; Shleifer & Vishney, supra note 33; Kahan, supra note 33. 
last year of the auditor’s tenure.  But while it is possible that the compensation scheme 
would cause the auditor to put extra emphasis on the final audit, I still believe that the plan 
generates beneficial incentives throughout the tenure period. Financial representations are 
based on the auditor’s long=term interpretation of the accounting standards and its accounting
iven the specific circumstances of the client.  An auditor must, therefore, be alert to 
any misreporting from the very beginning of its relationship with the client, for otherwise it 
would be hard pressed, in the audit-client negotiations, to maintain the status quo disclosure 
policy.  
Second, the plan features a holding period during which the auditor is required to 
hold the shares of its client at least until the next auditor issues its first audit report.  This 
feature is especially important since it means the auditor bears the risk that any hidden 
problem with the financial statements during its tenure period will at some point impact the 
share-prices during the holding period, when it is no longer in charge of certification.  The 
longer the holding period, the higher the chances that hidden problems will surface and affect 
share prices. This notwithstanding, however, I suggest that prolonged holding periods be 
avoided in order to minimize the delay in payment to the auditor and the unrelated market risk 
created by an excessively long holding period.  This does not mean that the auditor does not 
have to worry about errors in its audit that normally would not surface during a shorter 
holding period.  The reason is that the next auditor, assuming it is offered a similar 
compensation structure, will have to do its utmost to uncover problems that the
210  The same holds true for the next auditor and so on. 
 
 






At the core of this paper is the argument that the inability to observe audit quality 
justifies drafting an incentive contract that current law does not allow for. The paper has 
considered the costs and benefits of the structure of one such possible incentive scheme.  
Under the compensation plan advocated here, auditors would commit to becoming future 
shareholders of the corporation after they have concluded their tenure.  And as future 
shareholders, they should seek to guard against financial misrepresentations that artificially 
and temporally inflate the value of the shares they would purchased from the client.  Over 
time, share prices incorporate any adverse information that was not properly disclosed in the 
financial statements.  Thus, the compensation arrangement automatically holds the auditor 
accountable for allowing such faulty reporting.  The same unique benefits that have led to the 
widespread adoption of executive incentive compensation, therefore, support with equal force 
implementing auditor incentive compensation.  The paper does not argue that the proposed 
plan is suitable for all firms, but its clear advantages should cause the regulator to support and 
allow it.  Mid-cap and large-cap firms with stable performance and large auditors (mostly Big 
4 audit firms) seem most suited to this plan.  And once the regulator would be willing to 
accept the proposed scheme, major market players, such as institutional investors, lenders, 
and proxy advisors, that are interested in the integrity of share prices and good corporate 
governance should help to persuade firms and their auditors to adopt plans suited to their 
particular needs. 
Finally, there is good reason to believe that the need for the auditor fee structure 
oca dwide ccounting tand s ha e recently 
financial misrepresentations, even those that may emerge after the holding period.   
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
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undergone a revolution with the introduction of the International Financial Reporting 
v ted here will soon grow in urgency.  Worl
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compens
                                                          
Standards (“IFRS”).211  The most striking feature of these new standards is that all items in 
the balance sheet must be marked to market.  Instead of the traditional use of historical 
prices,212 each firm now has the discretion to evaluate and assess the market value of its assets 
and liabilities and include this in its disclosure.  Under the IFRS, executives, who already 
have an extensive amount of discretion in financial disclosures, gain even more freedom.  
Outside the United States, this augmented freedom does not pose a major threat, as public 
firms outside the U.S. tend to have a concentrated ownership structure, with a controlling 
shareholder.213  Since controlling shareholders seldom sell their holding stakes, they have 
little reason to engage in financial manipulation (at least not of the type often witnessed in the 
States).214  In contrast, U.S. managers are usually subject to a dispersed ownership structure 
without any controlling shareholder that monitors th
ation schemes that tends to lead to manipulation.  The combination of these features 
with the IFRS could be catastrophic. 
Thus far, the U.S. has yet to adopt the IFRS, but there has been rapid movement in 
that direction.  On November 15, 2007, the SEC adopted a proposal allowing foreign firms 
that trade on the U.S. securities market to choose the IFRS instead of the traditional U.S. 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.215  In addition, the Commission issued a release 
available at 
//ssr
 to firms in the majority of world economies, have a dispersed ownership 
 (1999) (same). 
 in accordance with 
08, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/33-8879.pdf. 
211  See HOLGER DASKE ET AL., MANDATORY IFRS REPORTING AROUND THE WORLD: EARLY EVIDENCE ON 
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES (Chicago GSB Research Paper No. 12, 2007), 
http: n.com/abstract=1024240 (examining the economic consequences of introducing mandatory IFRS 
reporting across the globe and pointing to indications of an increase in equity valuations). 
212  See STEPHEN A. ZEFF, THE SEC RULES HISTORICAL COST ACCOUNTING: 1934 TO THE 1970S (2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=956163 (discussing the principal of historical cost accounting). 
213  See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997) 
(reporting that U.S. firms, in contrast
structure); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the 
World, 54 J. FIN. 471
214  See Coffee, supra note 1, at 204 ("the controlling shareholder seldom, if ever, sells its control block in 
the public market”). 
215  See Acceptance from Foreign Private issuers of Financial Statements Prepared
IFRS Without Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP Mar. 4, 20
 
 








se will substantially increase.218  Innovative and well-crafted auditor incentive pay 
programs of the type advocated in this paper could counterweigh the resulting mounting 
pressures. 
                                                          
that raised the possibility of allowing all firms to similarly opt for the IFRS in the future.216  
Moreover, even if full adoption does not materialize soon, some form of convergence does 
seem imminent.217  The implications are that U.S. executives will soon have far greater 
discretion in drafting their firms' disclosures and, in turn, auditors' responsibility for fending 
against abu
216  See SEC Soliciting Public Comment on Role of IFRS in the U.S, July 25, 2007, at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-145.htm. 
217  See SHYAM SUNDER ET AL., A PERSPECTIVE ON THE SEC'S PROPOSAL TO ACCEPT FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS (IFRS) 
WITHOUT RECONCILIATION TO U.S. GAAP (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020408  (discussing 
IFRS versus U.S. GAAP and suggesting that the U.S. allow all issuers to choose between the two regimes). 
218  IFRS adoption in the U.S. gave rise to much concern for the reason mentioned in the text above. See 
PATRICK E. HOPKINS ET AL., RESPONSE BY THE FINANCIAL REPORTING POLICY COMMITTEE OF THE FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING SECTION OF THE AMERICAN ACCOUNTING ASSOCIATION TO THE SEC RELEASE: 
ACCEPTANCE FROM FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUERS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS WITHOUT RECONCILIATION TO U.S. GAAP (2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1083679 (discussing the acceptance of IFRS for foreign firms listed in the 
U.S. and concluding that IFRS adoption was premature).  
